Open mend-bolt-for-github[bot] opened 3 years ago
:heavy_check_mark: This issue was automatically closed by Mend because the vulnerable library in the specific branch(es) was either marked as ignored or it is no longer part of the Mend inventory.
:information_source: This issue was automatically re-opened by Mend because the vulnerable library in the specific branch(es) has been detected in the Mend inventory.
CVE-2021-21295 - Medium Severity Vulnerability
Vulnerable Library - netty-codec-http-4.1.36.Final.jar
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and clients.
Library home page: http://netty.io/
Path to dependency file: /packages/cactus-plugin-ledger-connector-corda/src/main-server/kotlin/gen/kotlin-spring/build.gradle.kts
Path to vulnerable library: /home/wss-scanner/.gradle/caches/modules-2/files-2.1/io.netty/netty-codec-http/4.1.36.Final/62b73d439dbddf3c0dde092b048580139695ab46/netty-codec-http-4.1.36.Final.jar
Dependency Hierarchy: - corda-rpc-4.5.jar (Root Library) - corda-node-api-4.5.jar - artemis-core-client-2.8.0.jar - :x: **netty-codec-http-4.1.36.Final.jar** (Vulnerable Library)
Found in HEAD commit: ceec9f73fd05cfdbf0061d53c9d0c42d43e85d22
Found in base branch: master
Vulnerability Details
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.
Publish Date: 2021-03-09
URL: CVE-2021-21295
CVSS 3 Score Details (5.9)
Base Score Metrics: - Exploitability Metrics: - Attack Vector: Network - Attack Complexity: High - Privileges Required: None - User Interaction: None - Scope: Unchanged - Impact Metrics: - Confidentiality Impact: None - Integrity Impact: High - Availability Impact: None
For more information on CVSS3 Scores, click here.Suggested Fix
Type: Upgrade version
Origin: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj
Release Date: 2021-03-09
Fix Resolution (io.netty:netty-codec-http): 4.1.60.Final
Direct dependency fix Resolution (net.corda:corda-rpc): 4.9
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