Who's this great for?
People who want better government but don't have time to vote on every bill. Choose trusted surrogates. You can still elect to exercise your vote personally on any bill, at any time.
Create a ranked list of "trusted voters" who you trust to vote for you
In event of two of your ranked politicians disagreeing on a bill, the one you ranked higher wins
If more than 2 disagree, Schultz method can find the optimal winner (see link below)
Since your "trusted voters" can also trust others, this organically creates a local/state/national hierarchy of politicians who have people's "trusted vote" and can help fund big budgets
give the same preference to more than one candidate. This indicates that this voter is indifferent between these candidates.
use non-consecutive numbers to express preferences. This has no impact on the result of the elections, since only the order in which the candidates are ranked by the voter matters, and not the absolute numbers of the preferences.
keep candidates unranked. When a voter doesn't rank all candidates, then this is interpreted as if this voter (i) strictly prefers all ranked to all unranked candidates, and (ii) is indifferent among all unranked candidates.
Fantasy football for politicians.
Who's this great for? People who want better government but don't have time to vote on every bill. Choose trusted surrogates. You can still elect to exercise your vote personally on any bill, at any time.
Resources -Condorcet method and optimal theoretical voting -Debian, Ubuntu, Wikimedia Foundation and Pirate Party used Schultz method, a Condorcet method