Open BigBlueHat opened 6 years ago
I wonder whether this is not a question for the Publ WG (too). What is the long term model that this industry wants?
Cc @TzviyaSiegman @GarthConboy
Proposal: close this issue, as LPF will essentially be used as epub today and epub has no update mechanism: the recipient of a package chooses to replace a file by another or not.
note: If #31 's decision is not to implement a signature mechanism, the reader will not know that the provider of an updated LPF file has changed.
If you send me a .epub file (or any other downloadable file), I have it. You can't update it without sending me another .epub--which I can choose to replace the old one, or I can use as a separate one, or I can ignore entirely.
This (somewhat) relates to this quote from #23:
An attacker, in this scenario, is considered someone besides the publisher, but in the eyes of the reader (who has potentially paid for a publication) the publisher and the "attacker" may be the same--i.e. Amazon removing copies of 1984 (etc).
Given that a single publication is currently identified by it's publication "address" (a URL) and (if we use WebPackage) will be signed by a single origin's certificate (i.e. rented authority mapped into that URL), what other facilities must we provide (on behalf of the reader) to prevent "overwriting" by either an attacker or even a publisher (however well intentioned).
How do we enable the reader to keep a publication--defined as part of the Web--if/when the underlying technology (domain, URL, certificate, etc) change under their feat?
See also #25.