w3c / sdw

Repository for the Spatial Data on the Web Working Group
https://www.w3.org/2020/sdw/
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[Responsible use] Feedback Re: context #1277

Open EmilyDaemen opened 3 years ago

EmilyDaemen commented 3 years ago

The level of intrusion varies per app, but all of them hold sensitive information as personal location data are, by definition, sensitive.

Feedback: Do all COVID-19 apps collect personal location data? I thought some only collected proximity data. BTW, would you consider proximity data to be spatial data? I’m raising this because I thought the apps based on the Apple-Google Exposure Notification protocol does not share location data (see, for example, https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/applications/covid19/current/static/contact-tracing/pdf/ExposureNotification-FAQv1.2.pdf).

Reply Emily: Something to think about…I personally would consider proximity data to be spatial data. What do the others think? And I would consider it to be personal data - but I'm not sure I fully understand the technical definition of proximity data. - Check with the co-authors.

jvanulde commented 3 years ago

Does it matter if the location/proximity data is anonymous/pseudo-anonymous? For example, some apps utilize a pseudo-anonymous storage key (i.e. same identifier for a user/device for each record) while others use an anonymous identifier (i.e. different key for every record).

EmilyDaemen commented 3 years ago

Great question - I'd imagine that does make a difference. Interesting points Joost! And relevant to delve into and clarify. I think for now I'll adjust the text to accomodate for your questions, but I'm definitely going to look into this further with the rest. Thanks!

Original text: The apps give government institutions (indeterminate) access to the users’ personal location data and record their potential COVID-19 symptoms. The level of intrusion varies per app, but all of them hold sensitive information as personal location data are, by definition, sensitive.

Change text: The level of intrusion varies per app: some give government institutions (indeterminate) access to the users’ personal location data, whilst others rely solely on (pseudo-)anonymous proximity data to track and trace.