Open yoavweiss opened 2 months ago
That's interesting. To start with, OAuth URLs and the class of 'sensitive' URLs (with tokens that change security capability, with URL:username and URL:password tokens) etc. don't have similar security indicators; sharing these are just as dangerous. There's of course, the requirement that developers are expected to implement 'capability' URLs correctly to this end, providing appropriate contextual information, in whatever standardized form they will have to appear as, to browsers and servers. There are also other web-based non-standardized derivatives that use URI components for security capabilities.
On Wed, Sep 11, 2024 at 4:54 PM Yoav Weiss @.***> wrote:
There are a lot of capability URLs https://www.w3.org/TR/capability-urls/ out there, but both browsers and servers are oblivious to the fact that a certain URL is a capability one.
If browsers were aware of capability URLs (e.g. through an attribute on the link that got the user to open them), they could have e.g. warned users if they are trying to share these URLs.
If well-meaning secure-context servers were aware of capability URLs (e.g. through a header that the capability-aware browser would attach to the relevant request), they could make sure that they don't find themselves in the server logs.
I'm not 100% sure what less-well-meaning servers can do with capability URLs from other origins, but presumably they should not be seeing these (secure-context) requests unless the origin (or the user, or their machine's administrator) trusted them to inspect the request.
I'd love folks' thoughts!
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There are a lot of capability URLs out there, but both browsers and servers are oblivious to the fact that a certain URL is a capability one.
If browsers were aware of capability URLs (e.g. through an attribute on the link that got the user to open them), they could have e.g. warned users if they are trying to share these URLs.
If well-meaning secure-context servers were aware of capability URLs (e.g. through a header that the capability-aware browser would attach to the relevant request), they could make sure that they don't find themselves in the server logs.
I'm not 100% sure what less-well-meaning servers can do with capability URLs from other origins, but presumably they should not be seeing these (secure-context) requests unless the origin (or the user, or their machine's administrator) trusted them to inspect the request.
I'd love folks' thoughts!