Closed burdges closed 4 years ago
I looked into mBCJ further. As written, it requires an aggregator check the proof-of-possession, but a malicious aggregator could simply ignore this, maybe permitting rogue public key attacks. I have not checked their security proof but it likely sweeps this under the rug with the key model. At some point @hndnklnc and I should look into a delinearized variant of mBCJ.
I have not found time to look into this more seriously, but mBCJ still looks like our most promising approach. Right now, there is no obvious uses for proof-of-possession in a signature scheme without true 1-RTT aggregation ala BLS, which makes mBCJ itself useless. Yet, several research questions remain:
We concluded mBCJ looks too messy for this, and we're close to a real answer, so closing.
We should explore the two round mBCJ signature scheme from pages 21 and 21 of https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/417.pdf using session type in the vein of the musig implementation in multi.rs
It requires a different verification from a schnorr signature, and comes with proofs-of-possession and a strange hierarchical relationship among the signers, but it does a two-round trip multi-signature without pairings.