🚨 [security] Update express 4.17.1 → 4.20.0 (minor)

[depfu[bot]]

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🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

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Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ express (4.17.1 → 4.20.0) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 express vulnerable to XSS via response.redirect()

Impact

In express <4.20.0, passing untrusted user input - even after sanitizing it - to response.redirect() may execute untrusted code

Patches

this issue is patched in express 4.20.0

Workarounds

users are encouraged to upgrade to the patched version of express, but otherwise can workaround this issue by making sure any untrusted inputs are safe, ideally by validating them against an explicit allowlist

Details

successful exploitation of this vector requires the following:

1. The attacker MUST control the input to response.redirect()
2. express MUST NOT redirect before the template appears
3. the browser MUST NOT complete redirection before:
4. the user MUST click on the link in the template

🚨 Express.js Open Redirect in malformed URLs

Impact

Versions of Express.js prior to 4.19.2 and pre-release alpha and beta versions before 5.0.0-beta.3 are affected by an open redirect vulnerability using malformed URLs.

When a user of Express performs a redirect using a user-provided URL Express performs an encode using encodeurl on the contents before passing it to the location header. This can cause malformed URLs to be evaluated in unexpected ways by common redirect allow list implementations in Express applications, leading to an Open Redirect via bypass of a properly implemented allow list.

The main method impacted is res.location() but this is also called from within res.redirect().

Patches

0867302
0b74695

An initial fix went out with express@4.19.0, we then patched a feature regression in 4.19.1 and added improved handling for the bypass in 4.19.2.

Workarounds

The fix for this involves pre-parsing the url string with either require('node:url').parse or new URL. These are steps you can take on your own before passing the user input string to res.location or res.redirect.

References

#5539
koajs/koa#1800
https://expressjs.com/en/4x/api.html#res.location

Release Notes

4.20.0

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4.19.2

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4.19.1

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4.19.0

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4.18.3

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4.18.2

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4.18.1

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4.18.0

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4.17.3

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4.17.2

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Commits

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↗️ accepts (indirect, 1.3.7 → 1.3.8) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.3.8

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Commits

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↗️ body-parser (indirect, 1.19.0 → 1.20.3) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 body-parser vulnerable to denial of service when url encoding is enabled

Impact

body-parser <1.20.3 is vulnerable to denial of service when url encoding is enabled. A malicious actor using a specially crafted payload could flood the server with a large number of requests, resulting in denial of service.

Patches

this issue is patched in 1.20.3

References

Release Notes

1.20.3

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1.20.2

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1.20.1 (from changelog)

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1.20.0

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1.19.2

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1.19.1

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Commits

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↗️ bytes (indirect, 3.1.0 → 3.1.2) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

3.1.2 (from changelog)

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3.1.1 (from changelog)

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Commits

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↗️ content-disposition (indirect, 0.5.3 → 0.5.4) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

0.5.4

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↗️ content-type (indirect, 1.0.4 → 1.0.5) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.0.5

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↗️ cookie (indirect, 0.4.0 → 0.6.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

0.6.0 (from changelog)

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0.5.0

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0.4.2

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0.4.1

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↗️ depd (indirect, 1.1.2 → 2.0.0) · Repo · Changelog

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↗️ destroy (indirect, 1.0.4 → 1.2.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.2.0 (from changelog)

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1.1.1 (from changelog)

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1.1.0 (from changelog)

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↗️ encodeurl (indirect, 1.0.2 → 2.0.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.0.0

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Commits

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↗️ finalhandler (indirect, 1.1.2 → 1.2.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.2.0

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↗️ forwarded (indirect, 0.1.2 → 0.2.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

0.2.0

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Commits

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↗️ http-errors (indirect, 1.7.2 → 2.0.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.0.0 (from changelog)

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1.8.1 (from changelog)

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1.8.0 (from changelog)

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↗️ merge-descriptors (indirect, 1.0.1 → 1.0.3) · Repo · Changelog

Commits

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↗️ mime-db (indirect, 1.44.0 → 1.52.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.52.0

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1.51.0

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1.50.0

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1.49.0

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1.48.0

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1.47.0

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1.46.0 (from changelog)

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↗️ mime-types (indirect, 2.1.27 → 2.1.35) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.1.35

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2.1.34

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2.1.33

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2.1.32

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2.1.31

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2.1.30

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2.1.29

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2.1.28

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↗️ negotiator (indirect, 0.6.2 → 0.6.3) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

0.6.3 (from changelog)

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Commits

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↗️ path-to-regexp (indirect, 0.1.7 → 0.1.10) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 path-to-regexp outputs backtracking regular expressions

Impact

A bad regular expression is generated any time you have two parameters within a single segment, separated by something that is not a period (.). For example, /:a-:b.

Patches

For users of 0.1, upgrade to 0.1.10. All other users should upgrade to 8.0.0.

These versions add backtrack protection when a custom regex pattern is not provided:

• 0.1.10
• 1.9.0
• 3.3.0
• 6.3.0

They do not protect against vulnerable user supplied capture groups. Protecting against explicit user patterns is out of scope for old versions and not considered a vulnerability.

Version 7.1.0 can enable strict: true and get an error when the regular expression might be bad.

Version 8.0.0 removes the features that can cause a ReDoS.

Workarounds

All versions can be patched by providing a custom regular expression for parameters after the first in a single segment. As long as the custom regular expression does not match the text before the parameter, you will be safe. For example, change /:a-:b to /:a-:b([^-/]+).

If paths cannot be rewritten and versions cannot be upgraded, another alternative is to limit the URL length. For example, halving the attack string improves performance by 4x faster.

Details

Using /:a-:b will produce the regular expression /^\/([^\/]+?)-([^\/]+?)\/?$/. This can be exploited by a path such as /a${'-a'.repeat(8_000)}/a. OWASP has a good example of why this occurs, but the TL;DR is the /a at the end ensures this route would never match but due to naive backtracking it will still attempt every combination of the :a-:b on the repeated 8,000 -a.

Because JavaScript is single threaded and regex matching runs on the main thread, poor performance will block the event loop and can lead to a DoS. In local benchmarks, exploiting the unsafe regex will result in performance that is over 1000x worse than the safe regex. In a more realistic environment using Express v4 and 10 concurrent connections, this translated to average latency of ~600ms vs 1ms.

References

• OWASP
• Detailed blog post

Release Notes

0.1.10

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0.1.9

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Commits

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↗️ proxy-addr (indirect, 2.0.6 → 2.0.7) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.0.7

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Commits

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↗️ qs (indirect, 6.7.0 → 6.11.0) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 qs vulnerable to Prototype Pollution

qs before 6.10.3 allows attackers to cause a Node process hang because an __ proto__ key can be used. In many typical web framework use cases, an unauthenticated remote attacker can place the attack payload in the query string of the URL that is used to visit the application, such as a[__proto__]=b&a[__proto__]&a[length]=100000000. The fix was backported to qs 6.9.7, 6.8.3, 6.7.3, 6.6.1, 6.5.3, 6.4.1, 6.3.3, and 6.2.4.

🚨 qs vulnerable to Prototype Pollution

qs before 6.10.3 allows attackers to cause a Node process hang because an __ proto__ key can be used. In many typical web framework use cases, an unauthenticated remote attacker can place the attack payload in the query string of the URL that is used to visit the application, such as a[__proto__]=b&a[__proto__]&a[length]=100000000. The fix was backported to qs 6.9.7, 6.8.3, 6.7.3, 6.6.1, 6.5.3, 6.4.1, 6.3.3, and 6.2.4.

🚨 qs vulnerable to Prototype Pollution

qs before 6.10.3 allows attackers to cause a Node process hang because an __ proto__ key can be used. In many typical web framework use cases, an unauthenticated remote attacker can place the attack payload in the query string of the URL that is used to visit the application, such as a[__proto__]=b&a[__proto__]&a[length]=100000000. The fix was backported to qs 6.9.7, 6.8.3, 6.7.3, 6.6.1, 6.5.3, 6.4.1, 6.3.3, and 6.2.4.

🚨 qs vulnerable to Prototype Pollution

qs before 6.10.3 allows attackers to cause a Node process hang because an __ proto__ key can be used. In many typical web framework use cases, an unauthenticated remote attacker can place the attack payload in the query string of the URL that is used to visit the application, such as a[__proto__]=b&a[__proto__]&a[length]=100000000. The fix was backported to qs 6.9.7, 6.8.3, 6.7.3, 6.6.1, 6.5.3, 6.4.1, 6.3.3, and 6.2.4.

Release Notes

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Commits

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↗️ raw-body (indirect, 2.4.0 → 2.5.2) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.5.2 (from changelog)

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2.5.1 (from changelog)

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2.5.0 (from changelog)

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2.4.3 (from changelog)

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2.4.2 (from changelog)

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2.4.1 (from changelog)

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↗️ send (indirect, 0.17.1 → 0.19.0) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 send vulnerable to template injection that can lead to XSS

Impact

passing untrusted user input - even after sanitizing it - to SendStream.redirect() may execute untrusted code

Patches

this issue is patched in send 0.19.0

Workarounds

users are encouraged to upgrade to the patched version of express, but otherwise can workaround this issue by making sure any untrusted inputs are safe, ideally by validating them against an explicit allowlist

Details

successful exploitation of this vector requires the following:

1. The attacker MUST control the input to response.redirect()
2. express MUST NOT redirect before the template appears
3. the browser MUST NOT complete redirection before:
4. the user MUST click on the link in the template

Release Notes

0.19.0

More info than we can show here.

0.18.0 (from changelog)

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0.17.2 (from changelog)

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Commits

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↗️ serve-static (indirect, 1.14.1 → 1.16.0) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 serve-static vulnerable to template injection that can lead to XSS

Impact

passing untrusted user input - even after sanitizing it - to redirect() may execute untrusted code

Patches

this issue is patched in serve-static 1.16.0

Workarounds

users are encouraged to upgrade to the patched version of express, but otherwise can workaround this issue by making sure any untrusted inputs are safe, ideally by validating them against an explicit allowlist

Details

successful exploitation of this vector requires the following:

1. The attacker MUST control the input to response.redirect()
2. express MUST NOT redirect before the template appears
3. the browser MUST NOT complete redirection before:
4. the user MUST click on the link in the template

Release Notes

1.16.0

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1.15.0

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1.14.2

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Commits

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↗️ setprototypeof (indirect, 1.1.1 → 1.2.0) · Repo

Commits

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↗️ statuses (indirect, 1.5.0 → 2.0.1) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.0.1 (from changelog)

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2.0.0 (from changelog)

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Commits

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↗️ toidentifier (indirect, 1.0.0 → 1.0.1) · Repo · Changelog

Commits

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🆕 call-bind (added, 1.0.7)

🆕 define-data-property (added, 1.1.4)

🆕 es-define-property (added, 1.0.0)

🆕 es-errors (added, 1.3.0)

🆕 get-intrinsic (added, 1.2.4)

🆕 gopd (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 has-property-descriptors (added, 1.0.2)

🆕 has-proto (added, 1.0.3)

🆕 has-symbols (added, 1.0.3)

🆕 hasown (added, 2.0.2)

🆕 object-inspect (added, 1.13.2)

🆕 set-function-length (added, 1.2.2)

🆕 side-channel (added, 1.0.6)

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Closed in favor of #635.

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Closed in favor of #635.

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Closed in favor of #635.

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Closed in favor of #635.

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Closed in favor of #635.

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Closed in favor of #635.