Update module github.com/docker/docker to v24 [SECURITY] - autoclosed

[renovate[bot]]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
github.com/docker/docker	v20.10.6+incompatible -> v24.0.9+incompatible

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-28842

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.

Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.

The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.

Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.

When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.

The overlay driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate.

Impact

Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration.

Patches

Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.

Workarounds

• In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For example, use the registry.k8s.io/pause image and a --mode global service.
• For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in host mode instead of ingress mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the ingress network.
• If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec. For example, iptables -A INPUT -m udp —-dport 4789 -m policy --dir in --pol none -j DROP.

Background

• This issue was discovered while characterizing and mitigating CVE-2023-28840 and CVE-2023-28841.

Related

• CVE-2023-28841: Encrypted overlay network traffic may be unencrypted
• CVE-2023-28840: Encrypted overlay network may be unauthenticated
• GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw: The Swarm VXLAN port may be exposed to attack due to ambiguous documentation
• GHSA-gvm4-2qqg-m333: Security issues in encrypted overlay networks (libnetwork)

CVE-2023-28841

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.

Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.

The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.

Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.

When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.

An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation.

On Red Hat Enterprise Linux and derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky, the xt_u32 module has been:

• moved to the kernel-modules-extra package and no longer installed by default in RHEL 8.3
• officially deprecated in RHEL 8.6
• removed completely in RHEL 9

This rule is not created when xt_u32 is unavailable, even though the container is still attached to the network.

Impact

Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, overlay networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees.

It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may rely on Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability is no longer guaranteed.

Patches

Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.

Workarounds

• Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary (see GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw) in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet.
• Ensure that the xt_u32 kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

Background

• #​43382 partially discussed this concern, but did not consider the security implications.
• Mirantis FIELD-5788 essentially duplicates #​43382, and was created six months earlier; it similarly overlooked the security implications.
• #​45118 is the ancestor of the final patches, and was where the security implications were discovered.

Related

• CVE-2023-28840: Encrypted overlay network may be unauthenticated
• CVE-2023-28842: Encrypted overlay network with a single endpoint is unauthenticated
• GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw: The Swarm VXLAN port may be exposed to attack due to ambiguous documentation
• GHSA-gvm4-2qqg-m333: Security issues in encrypted overlay networks (libnetwork)

CVE-2023-28840

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.

Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.

The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.

Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.

When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.

Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded.

On Red Hat Enterprise Linux and derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky, the xt_u32 module has been:

• moved to the kernel-modules-extra package and no longer installed by default in RHEL 8.3
• officially deprecated in RHEL 8.6
• removed completely in RHEL 9

These rules are not created when xt_u32 is unavailable, even though the container is still attached to the network.

Impact

Encrypted overlay networks on affected configurations silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams.

The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network.

Patches

Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.

Workarounds

• Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary (see GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw) to prevent all VXLAN packet injection.
• Ensure that the xt_u32 kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

Background

• #​43382 partially discussed this concern, but did not consider the security implications.
• Mirantis FIELD-5788 essentially duplicates #​43382, and was created six months earlier; it similarly overlooked the security implications.
• #​45118 is the ancestor of the final patches, and was where the security implications were discovered.

Related

• CVE-2023-28841: Encrypted overlay network traffic may be unencrypted
• CVE-2023-28842: Encrypted overlay network with a single endpoint is unauthenticated
• GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw: The Swarm VXLAN port may be exposed to attack due to ambiguous documentation
• GHSA-gvm4-2qqg-m333: Security issues in encrypted overlay networks (libnetwork)

GHSA-jq35-85cj-fj4p

Intel's RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) feature, introduced by the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture, provides software insights into hardware energy consumption. To facilitate this, Intel introduced the powercap framework in Linux kernel 3.13, which reads values via relevant MSRs (model specific registers) and provides unprivileged userspace access via sysfs. As RAPL is an interface to access a hardware feature, it is only available when running on bare metal with the module compiled into the kernel.

By 2019, it was realized that in some cases unprivileged access to RAPL readings could be exploited as a power-based side-channel against security features including AES-NI (potentially inside a SGX enclave) and KASLR (kernel address space layout randomization). Also known as the PLATYPUS attack, Intel assigned CVE-2020-8694 and CVE-2020-8695, and AMD assigned CVE-2020-12912.

Several mitigations were applied; Intel reduced the sampling resolution via a microcode update, and the Linux kernel prevents access by non-root users since 5.10. However, this kernel-based mitigation does not apply to many container-based scenarios:

• Unless using user namespaces, root inside a container has the same level of privilege as root outside the container, but with a slightly more narrow view of the system
• sysfs is mounted inside containers read-only; however only read access is needed to carry out this attack on an unpatched CPU

While this is not a direct vulnerability in container runtimes, defense in depth and safe defaults are valuable and preferred, especially as this poses a risk to multi-tenant container environments running directly on affected hardware. This is provided by masking /sys/devices/virtual/powercap in the default mount configuration, and adding an additional set of rules to deny it in the default AppArmor profile.

While sysfs is not the only way to read from the RAPL subsystem, other ways of accessing it require additional capabilities such as CAP_SYS_RAWIO which is not available to containers by default, or perf paranoia level less than 1, which is a non-default kernel tunable.

References

• https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8694
• https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8695
• https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-12912
• https://platypusattack.com/
• https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=949dd0104c496fa7c14991a23c03c62e44637e71
• https://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver/projects/rapl/

CVE-2024-24557

The classic builder cache system is prone to cache poisoning if the image is built FROM scratch. Also, changes to some instructions (most important being HEALTHCHECK and ONBUILD) would not cause a cache miss.

An attacker with the knowledge of the Dockerfile someone is using could poison their cache by making them pull a specially crafted image that would be considered as a valid cache candidate for some build steps.

For example, an attacker could create an image that is considered as a valid cache candidate for:

FROM scratch
MAINTAINER Pawel

when in fact the malicious image used as a cache would be an image built from a different Dockerfile.

In the second case, the attacker could for example substitute a different HEALTCHECK command.

Impact

23.0+ users are only affected if they explicitly opted out of Buildkit (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0 environment variable) or are using the /build API endpoint (which uses the classic builder by default).

All users on versions older than 23.0 could be impacted. An example could be a CI with a shared cache, or just a regular Docker user pulling a malicious image due to misspelling/typosquatting.

Image build API endpoint (/build) and ImageBuild function from github.com/docker/docker/client is also affected as it the uses classic builder by default.

Patches

Patches are included in Moby releases:

• v25.0.2
• v24.0.9
• v23.0.10

Workarounds

• Use --no-cache or use Buildkit if possible (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1, it's default on 23.0+ assuming that the buildx plugin is installed).
• Use Version = types.BuilderBuildKit or NoCache = true in ImageBuildOptions for ImageBuild call.

CVE-2024-29018

Moby is an open source container framework originally developed by Docker Inc. as Docker. It is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. As a batteries-included container runtime, Moby comes with a built-in networking implementation that enables communication between containers, and between containers and external resources.

Moby's networking implementation allows for creating and using many networks, each with their own subnet and gateway. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters, and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the --internal flag is used to designate a network as internal. The internal attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network internal, and other API clients may specify the internal parameter as well.

When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses (typically from a non-routable RFC 1918 subnet). The root network namespace (hereafter referred to as the 'host') serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs.

Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly.

In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, dockerd directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery (looking up other containers on the network by name), and resolution of names from an upstream resolver.

When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver (by default, the host's configured resolver). This request is made from the container network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself.

As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to internal network(s) will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved.

Many systems will run a local forwarding DNS resolver, typically present on a loopback address (127.0.0.0/8), such as systemd-resolved or dnsmasq. Common loopback address examples include 127.0.0.1 or 127.0.0.53. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device.

To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, dockerd will detect this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host/root network namespace. The loopback resolver will then forward the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected.

Impact

Because dockerd will forward DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver.

By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. For example, if the domain evil.example was registered, the authoritative nameserver(s) for that domain could (eventually and indirectly) receive a request for this-is-a-secret.evil.example.

Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address.

Patches

Moby releases 26.0.0-rc3, 25.0.5 (released) and 23.0.11 (to be released) are patched to prevent forwarding DNS requests from internal networks.

Workarounds

• Run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address (--dns argument to docker run, or API equivalent), which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container network namespace.

Background

• yair zak originally reported this issue to the Docker security team.
• PR https://togithub.com/moby/moby/pull/46609 was opened in public to fix this issue, as it was not originally considered to have a security implication.
• The official documentation claims that "the --internal flag that will completely isolate containers on a network from any communications external to that network," which necessitated this advisory and CVE.

CVE-2022-24769

Impact

A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where containers were incorrectly started with non-empty inheritable Linux process capabilities, creating an atypical Linux environment and enabling programs with inheritable file capabilities to elevate those capabilities to the permitted set during execve(2). Normally, when executable programs have specified permitted file capabilities, otherwise unprivileged users and processes can execute those programs and gain the specified file capabilities up to the bounding set. Due to this bug, containers which included executable programs with inheritable file capabilities allowed otherwise unprivileged users and processes to additionally gain these inheritable file capabilities up to the container's bounding set. Containers which use Linux users and groups to perform privilege separation inside the container are most directly impacted.

This bug did not affect the container security sandbox as the inheritable set never contained more capabilities than were included in the container's bounding set.

Patches

This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.14. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. Running containers should be stopped, deleted, and recreated for the inheritable capabilities to be reset.

This fix changes Moby (Docker Engine) behavior such that containers are started with a more typical Linux environment. Refer to capabilities(7) for a description of how capabilities work. Note that permitted file capabilities continue to allow for privileges to be raised up to the container's bounding set and that processes may add capabilities to their own inheritable set up to the container's bounding set per the rules described in the manual page. In all cases the container's bounding set provides an upper bound on the capabilities that can be assumed and provides for the container security sandbox.

Workarounds

The entrypoint of a container can be modified to use a utility like capsh(1) to drop inheritable capabilities prior to the primary process starting.

Credits

The Moby project would like to thank Andrew G. Morgan for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the Moby security policy.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Open an issue
• Email us at security@docker.com if you think you’ve found a security bug

CVE-2021-41091

Impact

A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where the data directory (typically /var/lib/docker) contained subdirectories with insufficiently restricted permissions, allowing otherwise unprivileged Linux users to traverse directory contents and execute programs. When containers included executable programs with extended permission bits (such as setuid), unprivileged Linux users could discover and execute those programs. When the UID of an unprivileged Linux user on the host collided with the file owner or group inside a container, the unprivileged Linux user on the host could discover, read, and modify those files.

Patches

This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.9. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed.

Workarounds

Limit access to the host to trusted users. Limit access to host volumes to trusted containers.

Credits

The Moby project would like to thank Joan Bruguera for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the Moby security policy.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Open an issue
• Email us at security@docker.com if you think you’ve found a security bug

CVE-2021-41089

Impact

A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where attempting to copy files using docker cp into a specially-crafted container can result in Unix file permission changes for existing files in the host’s filesystem, widening access to others. This bug does not directly allow files to be read, modified, or executed without an additional cooperating process.

Patches

This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.9. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. Running containers do not need to be restarted.

Workarounds

Ensure you only run trusted containers.

Credits

The Moby project would like to thank Lei Wang and Ruizhi Xiao for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the Moby security policy.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Open an issue
• Email us at  security@docker.com  if you think you’ve found a security bug

GHSA-xmmx-7jpf-fx42

Impact

In the OCI Distribution Specification version 1.0.0 and prior and in the OCI Image Specification version 1.0.1 and prior, manifest and index documents are ambiguous without an accompanying Content-Type HTTP header. Versions of Moby (Docker Engine) prior to 20.10.11 treat the Content-Type header as trusted and deserialize the document according to that header. If the Content-Type header changed between pulls of the same ambiguous document (with the same digest), the document may be interpreted differently, meaning that the digest alone is insufficient to unambiguously identify the content of the image.

Patches

This issue has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.11. Image pulls for manifests that contain a “manifests” field or indices which contain a “layers” field are rejected.

Workarounds

Ensure you only pull images from trusted sources.

References

https://github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec/security/advisories/GHSA-mc8v-mgrf-8f4m https://github.com/opencontainers/image-spec/security/advisories/GHSA-77vh-xpmg-72qh

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Open an issue in
• Email us at security@docker.com

CVE-2022-36109

Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where supplementary groups are not set up properly. If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. This bug is fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.18. Users should update to this version when it is available. Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed. For users unable to upgrade, this problem can be worked around by not using the "USER $USERNAME" Dockerfile instruction. Instead by calling ENTRYPOINT ["su", "-", "user"] the supplementary groups will be set up properly.

Thanks to Steven Murdoch for reporting this issue.

---

Impact

If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container.

Patches

This bug is fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.18. Users should update to this version when it is available.

Workarounds

This problem can be worked around by not using the "USER $USERNAME" Dockerfile instruction. Instead by calling ENTRYPOINT ["su", "-", "user"] the supplementary groups will be set up properly.

References

https://www.benthamsgaze.org/2022/08/22/vulnerability-in-linux-containers-investigation-and-mitigation/

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Open an issue
• Email us at security@docker.com

GHSA-vp35-85q5-9f25

Description

Moby is the open source Linux container runtime and set of components used to build a variety of downstream container runtimes, including Docker CE, Mirantis Container Runtime (formerly Docker EE), and Docker Desktop. Moby allows for building container images using a set of build instructions (usually named and referred to as a "Dockerfile"), and a build context, which is not unlike the CWD in which the Dockerfile instructions are executed.

Containers may be built using a variety of tools and build backends available in the Moby ecosystem; in all cases, builds may not include files outside of the build context (such as using absolute or relative-parent paths). This is enforced through both checks in the build backends, and the containerization of the build process itself.

Versions of Git where CVE-2022-39253 is present and exploited by a malicious repository, when used in combination with Moby, are subject to an unexpected inclusion of arbitrary filesystem paths in the build context, without any visible warning to the user.

This issue was originally reported by Wenxiang Qian of Tencent Blade Team, and the root-cause analysis was performed by Cory Snider of Mirantis, with assistance from Bjorn Neergaard of the same. The issue was then reported to the Git project, and Taylor Blau led the process resolving the root issue in Git.

Impact

This vulnerability originates in Git, but can be used to violate assumptions that may have security implications for users of Moby and related components. Users may rely on the fact that a build context ensures that outside files cannot be referenced or incorporated using multiple enforcement mechanisms, or expect a warning if this does not hold true. A maliciously crafted Git repository exploiting CVE-2022-39253 can violate this assumption, and potentially include sensitive files that are subsequently uploaded to a container image repository, or disclosed by code inside the resulting container image.

As this issue cannot be triggered remotely, except by users who already have full control over the daemon through the API, and it requires exploiting a vulnerability in Git by convincing a user to build a maliciously crafted repository, the impact in Moby is considered low.

Patches

Moby 20.10.20, and Mirantis Container Runtime (formerly Docker Enterprise Edition) 20.10.14 will contain mitigations for CVE-2022-39253 when a Git clone is performed by Moby components (on either the daemon or API client side). However, as these mitigations only apply to certain scenarios (build of git+<protocol>://... URL contexts) and cannot protect against a malicious repository already on disk, users should update to a version of Git containing patches for CVE-2022-39253 on all their systems running both API clients and daemons.

Specifically, patches in Moby (including patches incorporated from BuildKit) protect against the following:

• docker build with the legacy builder (e.g. DOCKER_BUILDKIT unset or set to 0) of a Git URL context. Note that depending on available API versions and the CLI version, the Git clone operation can take place on either the client or the daemon side. Both must be updated (or have Git updated) to fully protect this build method.
• docker build with the BuildKit builder (e.g. DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1) of a Git URL context.
• docker buildx build with BUILDKIT_CONTEXT_KEEP_GIT_DIR=1 of a Git URL context.

Patches in BuildKit incorporated into Docker Compose protect against CVE-2022-39253 during Compose-driven builds of Git URL contexts.

Patches in Moby and related projects such as BuildKit, the Docker CLI, and Docker Compose cannot fully protect against CVE-2022-39253, as it may be triggered by a malicious repository already on disk that a unpatched Git client has interacted with (specifically, commands that check out submodules such as git clone --recursive, git submodule update, etc. may have already triggered the Git vulnerability).

Workarounds

While this behavior is unexpected and undesirable, and has resulted in this security advisory, users should keep in mind that building a container entails arbitrary code execution. Users should not build a repository/build context they do not trust, as containerization cannot protect against all possible attacks.

When building with BuildKit (e.g. docker buildx build or docker build with DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1), this issue cannot be exploited unless --build-arg BUILDKIT_CONTEXT_KEEP_GIT_DIR=1 was also passed, as by default BuildKit will discard the .git directory of a Git URL context immediately after cloning and checking out the repository.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Open an issue
• Email us at security@docker.com

CVE-2024-41110

A security vulnerability has been detected in certain versions of Docker Engine, which could allow an attacker to bypass authorization plugins (AuthZ) under specific circumstances. The base likelihood of this being exploited is low. This advisory outlines the issue, identifies the affected versions, and provides remediation steps for impacted users.

Impact

Using a specially-crafted API request, an Engine API client could make the daemon forward the request or response to an authorization plugin without the body. In certain circumstances, the authorization plugin may allow a request which it would have otherwise denied if the body had been forwarded to it.

A security issue was discovered In 2018, where an attacker could bypass AuthZ plugins using a specially crafted API request. This could lead to unauthorized actions, including privilege escalation. Although this issue was fixed in Docker Engine v18.09.1 in January 2019, the fix was not carried forward to later major versions, resulting in a regression. Anyone who depends on authorization plugins that introspect the request and/or response body to make access control decisions is potentially impacted.

Docker EE v19.03.x and all versions of Mirantis Container Runtime are not vulnerable.

Vulnerability details

• AuthZ bypass and privilege escalation: An attacker could exploit a bypass using an API request with Content-Length set to 0, causing the Docker daemon to forward the request without the body to the AuthZ plugin, which might approve the request incorrectly.
• Initial fix: The issue was fixed in Docker Engine v18.09.1 January 2019..
• Regression: The fix was not included in Docker Engine v19.03 or newer versions. This was identified in April 2024 and patches were released for the affected versions on July 23, 2024. The issue was assigned CVE-2024-41110.

Patches

• docker-ce v27.1.1 containes patches to fix the vulnerability.
• Patches have also been merged into the master, 19.0, 20.0, 23.0, 24.0, 25.0, 26.0, and 26.1 release branches.

Remediation steps

• If you are running an affected version, update to the most recent patched version.
• Mitigation if unable to update immediately:
  • Avoid using AuthZ plugins.
  • Restrict access to the Docker API to trusted parties, following the principle of least privilege.

References

• https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/fc274cd2ff4cf3b48c91697fb327dd1fb95588fb
• https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/a79fabbfe84117696a19671f4aa88b82d0f64fc1
• https://www.docker.com/blog/docker-security-advisory-docker-engine-authz-plugin/

---

Release Notes

docker/docker (github.com/docker/docker)

### [`v24.0.9+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.8...v24.0.9) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.8...v24.0.9) ### [`v24.0.8+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.7...v24.0.8) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.7...v24.0.8) ### [`v24.0.7+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.6...v24.0.7) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.6...v24.0.7) ### [`v24.0.6+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.5...v24.0.6) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.5...v24.0.6) ### [`v24.0.5+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.4...v24.0.5) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.4...v24.0.5) ### [`v24.0.4+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.3...v24.0.4) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.3...v24.0.4) ### [`v24.0.3+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.2...v24.0.3) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.2...v24.0.3) ### [`v24.0.2+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.1...v24.0.2) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.1...v24.0.2) ### [`v24.0.1+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.0...v24.0.1) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.0...v24.0.1) ### [`v24.0.0+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.9...v24.0.0) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.13...v24.0.0) ### [`v23.0.13+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.12...v23.0.13) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.12...v23.0.13) ### [`v23.0.12+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.11...v23.0.12) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.11...v23.0.12) ### [`v23.0.11+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.10...v23.0.11) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.10...v23.0.11) ### [`v23.0.10+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.9...v23.0.10) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.9...v23.0.10) ### [`v23.0.9+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.8...v23.0.9) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.8...v23.0.9) ### [`v23.0.8+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.7...v23.0.8) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.7...v23.0.8) ### [`v23.0.7+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.6...v23.0.7) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.6...v23.0.7) ### [`v23.0.6+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.5...v23.0.6) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.5...v23.0.6) ### [`v23.0.5+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.4...v23.0.5) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.4...v23.0.5) ### [`v23.0.4+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.3...v23.0.4) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.3...v23.0.4) ### [`v23.0.3+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.2...v23.0.3) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.2...v23.0.3) ### [`v23.0.2+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.1...v23.0.2) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.1...v23.0.2) ### [`v23.0.1+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.0...v23.0.1) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v23.0.0...v23.0.1) ### [`v23.0.0+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.25...v23.0.0) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.27...v23.0.0) ### [`v20.10.27+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.26...v20.10.27) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.26...v20.10.27) ### [`v20.10.26+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.25...v20.10.26) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.25...v20.10.26) ### [`v20.10.25+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.24...v20.10.25) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.24...v20.10.25) ### [`v20.10.24+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.23...v20.10.24) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.23...v20.10.24) ### [`v20.10.23+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.22...v20.10.23) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.22...v20.10.23) ### [`v20.10.22+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.21...v20.10.22) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.21...v20.10.22) ### [`v20.10.21+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.20...v20.10.21) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.20...v20.10.21) ### [`v20.10.20+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.19...v20.10.20) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.19...v20.10.20) ### [`v20.10.19+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.18...v20.10.19) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.18...v20.10.19) ### [`v20.10.18+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.17...v20.10.18) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.17...v20.10.18) ### [`v20.10.17+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.16...v20.10.17) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.16...v20.10.17) ### [`v20.10.16+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.15...v20.10.16) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.15...v20.10.16) ### [`v20.10.15+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.14...v20.10.15) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.14...v20.10.15) ### [`v20.10.14+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.13...v20.10.14) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.13...v20.10.14) ### [`v20.10.13+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.12...v20.10.13) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.12...v20.10.13) ### [`v20.10.12+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.11...v20.10.12) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.11...v20.10.12) ### [`v20.10.11+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.10...v20.10.11) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.10...v20.10.11) ### [`v20.10.10+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.9...v20.10.10) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.9...v20.10.10) ### [`v20.10.9+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.8...v20.10.9) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.8...v20.10.9) ### [`v20.10.8+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.7...v20.10.8) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.7...v20.10.8) ### [`v20.10.7+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.6...v20.10.7) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.6...v20.10.7)

---

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

---

• [ ] If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

---

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

[stale[bot]]

This issue has been automatically marked as stale because it has not had recent activity. It will be closed if no further activity occurs. Thank you for your contributions.