Open holmesworcester opened 4 years ago
Corresponding zecwalletlight-cli issue: https://github.com/adityapk00/zecwallet-light-cli/issues/62
This would require changes to lightwalletd and tests. A large onus is on the wallet for requesting and verifying data.
This is on hold until NU5 release and lightwalletd overhaul.
Right now, according to the wallet app threat model a malicious or compromised lightwalletd can omit transactions, concealing them from the wallet user.
This is undesirable because it means that a wallet app provides significantly less guarantees to the user than a full node, and it increases how much trust the wallet app user must put in their choice of lightwalletd, increasing centralization.
In Zbay's use case, where memos on Sapling transactions are used to register usernames, it means that a malicious lightwalletd could spoof usernames, and potentially send or receive messages or funds on behalf of a user. https://github.com/ZbayApp/zbay/issues/517
In the light wallet working group, str4d explained that addressing this vulnerability is possible for Sapling transactions, but requires implementing FlyClient support:
As I understand this, the fix for this pre-Heartwood can be addressed without changes to lightwalletd, but post-Heartwood the fix requires changes to lightwalletd.
I don't know how much work this is, or how to prioritize it, but it seemed best to create this issue to track it. It seems helpful to address this, in order to bring the security guarantees of lightwallet apps closer to the security guarantees of a full zcash node.