How can 'space' be a particular.
Do I have it right (dihir) that there is now a new term 'relational
specifically dependent continuant'
dihir that we do not have a way to talk about the volume of a spatial region?
dihir that there is no specific dependence on spatial regions.
dihir that there should be a relation "material_part_of"
dihir that we are being silent on whether dependent continuants have parts,
except that if they do they can't be of another type than their own most
specific type? (qualities can't have parts that are not qualities, functions
can't have parts that aren't functions, etc.)
dihir that realization is only defined on realizable entities (and so the
elucidation of quality is malformed?
Elucidation: a quality is a specifically dependent continuant that, in contrast
to roles and dispositions, does not require any further process in order to be
realized. [055-001]]) - this suggests it might otherwise be realized.
In your comment on color:"Note that in the above list of examples we encounter
a further type of dependence, turning on the fact that, for example, the color
of a tomato depends in some sense on processes involving photons. This type of
dependence is not dealt with in the BFO 2.0 specification, but will be treated
in the future."
Can you explain why this is not the same type of dependence on occurrent type
that 'realizes' expresses?
dihir that relational quality will have two parents - quality and relational
specifically dependent continuant?
Why does a two dimensional spatial region not s-depend on a 3 dimensional
spatial region, and that on a spatiotemporal region? Instance of each *must* be
embedded in an instance of the next type.
Can you give me an example of a role that does not a exists because there is
some single bearer that is in some special *physical* circumstance in which
this bearer does not have to be? None of the examples in the reference seem to
be such.
Can you clarify what the temporal extent of "is" in the above definition.
You write: "Some qualities and dispositions are non-optional in the sense that,
if they cease to exist, then their bearer ceases to exist. (Consider for
example the quality mass.) Such cases will be dealt with in a future version
of BFO." Can you give me a reason (other than a formal one) why such should not
be considered mutual s-dependence?
What does this mean? " pyramidal neuron plays the role occupied by a damaged
stellar neuron in the brain " Do you have a citation?
What is the reference of "it" in: "a(g-depends on)[Axiom: if a g-depends_on b
at some time t, then a g-depends_on something at all times at which it exists.
[073-001] ]
"? If it=a then this is wrong. If it=b I'm not completely sure this is right
(I am trying to think of a counterexample).
Why do you want to include "migration" in your discussion of GDCs. It doesn't
seem necessary.
How does time unfold itself in time? (there is nothing extra that time has to
unfold) (relates to the definition of occurrent)
not a question: This note "The occupies relation is the counterpart, on the
occurrent side, of the relation located_at." should say "Together, the occupies
and spans relations are the counterpart, on the occurrent side, of the relation
located_at.]"
I see now elucidations for history (good!) and life. dihir, however, that only
"history" is in BFO.
Original issue reported on code.google.com by alanruttenberg@gmail.com on 13 Jul 2012 at 7:47
Original issue reported on code.google.com by
alanruttenberg@gmail.comon 13 Jul 2012 at 7:47