How can 'space' be a particular.
Do I have it right (dihir) that there is now a new term 'relational specifically dependent continuant'
dihir that we do not have a way to talk about the volume of a spatial region?
dihir that there is no specific dependence on spatial regions.
dihir that there should be a relation "material_part_of"
dihir that we are being silent on whether dependent continuants have parts, except that if they do they can't be of another type than their own most specific type? (qualities can't have parts that are not qualities, functions can't have parts that aren't functions, etc.)
dihir that realization is only defined on realizable entities (and so the elucidation of quality is malformed?
Elucidation: a quality is a specifically dependent continuant that, in contrast to roles and dispositions, does not require any further process in order to be realized. [055-001]]) - this suggests it might otherwise be realized.
In your comment on color:"Note that in the above list of examples we encounter a further type of dependence, turning on the fact that, for example, the color of a tomato depends in some sense on processes involving photons. This type of dependence is not dealt with in the BFO 2.0 specification, but will be treated in the future."
Can you explain why this is not the same type of dependence on occurrent type that 'realizes' expresses?
dihir that relational quality will have two parents - quality and relational specifically dependent continuant?
Why does a two dimensional spatial region not s-depend on a 3 dimensional spatial region, and that on a spatiotemporal region? Instance of each must be embedded in an instance of the next type.
Can you give me an example of a role that does not a exists because there is some single bearer that is in some special physical circumstance in which this bearer does not have to be? None of the examples in the reference seem to be such.
Can you clarify what the temporal extent of "is" in the above definition.
You write: "Some qualities and dispositions are non-optional in the sense that, if they cease to exist, then their bearer ceases to exist. (Consider for example the quality mass.) Such cases will be dealt with in a future version of BFO." Can you give me a reason (other than a formal one) why such should not be considered mutual s-dependence?
What does this mean? " pyramidal neuron plays the role occupied by a damaged stellar neuron in the brain " Do you have a citation?
What is the reference of "it" in: "a(g-depends on)[Axiom: if a g-depends_on b at some time t, then a g-depends_on something at all times at which it exists. [073-001] ]
"? If it=a then this is wrong. If it=b I'm not completely sure this is right (I am trying to think of a counterexample).
Why do you want to include "migration" in your discussion of GDCs. It doesn't seem necessary.
How does time unfold itself in time? (there is nothing extra that time has to unfold) (relates to the definition of occurrent)
not a question: This note "The occupies relation is the counterpart, on the occurrent side, of the relation located_at." should say "Together, the occupies and spans relations are the counterpart, on the occurrent side, of the relation located_at.]"
I see now elucidations for history (good!) and life. dihir, however, that only "history" is in BFO.
From alanruttenberg@gmail.com on July 13, 2012 15:47:25
How can 'space' be a particular. Do I have it right (dihir) that there is now a new term 'relational specifically dependent continuant' dihir that we do not have a way to talk about the volume of a spatial region? dihir that there is no specific dependence on spatial regions. dihir that there should be a relation "material_part_of" dihir that we are being silent on whether dependent continuants have parts, except that if they do they can't be of another type than their own most specific type? (qualities can't have parts that are not qualities, functions can't have parts that aren't functions, etc.) dihir that realization is only defined on realizable entities (and so the elucidation of quality is malformed?
Elucidation: a quality is a specifically dependent continuant that, in contrast to roles and dispositions, does not require any further process in order to be realized. [055-001]]) - this suggests it might otherwise be realized.
In your comment on color:"Note that in the above list of examples we encounter a further type of dependence, turning on the fact that, for example, the color of a tomato depends in some sense on processes involving photons. This type of dependence is not dealt with in the BFO 2.0 specification, but will be treated in the future."
Can you explain why this is not the same type of dependence on occurrent type that 'realizes' expresses?
dihir that relational quality will have two parents - quality and relational specifically dependent continuant?
Why does a two dimensional spatial region not s-depend on a 3 dimensional spatial region, and that on a spatiotemporal region? Instance of each must be embedded in an instance of the next type.
Can you give me an example of a role that does not a exists because there is some single bearer that is in some special physical circumstance in which this bearer does not have to be? None of the examples in the reference seem to be such.
Can you clarify what the temporal extent of "is" in the above definition.
You write: "Some qualities and dispositions are non-optional in the sense that, if they cease to exist, then their bearer ceases to exist. (Consider for example the quality mass.) Such cases will be dealt with in a future version of BFO." Can you give me a reason (other than a formal one) why such should not be considered mutual s-dependence?
What does this mean? " pyramidal neuron plays the role occupied by a damaged stellar neuron in the brain " Do you have a citation?
What is the reference of "it" in: "a(g-depends on)[Axiom: if a g-depends_on b at some time t, then a g-depends_on something at all times at which it exists. [073-001] ] "? If it=a then this is wrong. If it=b I'm not completely sure this is right (I am trying to think of a counterexample).
Why do you want to include "migration" in your discussion of GDCs. It doesn't seem necessary.
How does time unfold itself in time? (there is nothing extra that time has to unfold) (relates to the definition of occurrent)
not a question: This note "The occupies relation is the counterpart, on the occurrent side, of the relation located_at." should say "Together, the occupies and spans relations are the counterpart, on the occurrent side, of the relation located_at.]"
I see now elucidations for history (good!) and life. dihir, however, that only "history" is in BFO.
Original issue: http://code.google.com/p/bfo/issues/detail?id=108