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# Handle
pauliax
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
WETH address is hardcoded but it may differ on other chains, e.g. Polygon, so make sure to check this before deploying and update if neccessary:
…
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# Handle
pauliax
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
First perform the addition and only then check the length to avoid this duplicate math operation:
require(b.length >= index + 32, "BytesLib: …
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# Handle
pauliax
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
There is a common issue that ecrecover returns empty (0x0) address when the signature is invalid. function recoverAddrImpl should check that befo…
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Cryptographic operations shouldn't be the frontend/GUIs responsibility. Instead, they should be handled by the DeFi framework. To achieve this we should:
- Allow initialization of the framework witho…
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# Handle
ye0lde
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Shortening revert strings to fit in 32 bytes will decrease deploy time gas and will decrease runtime gas when the revert condition has been met. …
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# Handle
JMukesh
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
require message give the idea what was the cause of failure , so its the best practise to add message in require()
## Proof of Concept
https://…
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# Handle
JMukesh
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested with thoroughly. Locking the pragma helps to ens…
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# Handle
WatchPug
# Vulnerability details
In `QuickAccManager.sol#cancel()`, the `hashTx` to identify the transaction to be canceled is wrong. The last parameter is missing.
As a result, users wi…
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# Handle
loop
# Vulnerability details
The `withdraw` function in `IdentityFactory.sol` is declared as public but can be external since it is not used internally.
## Impact
Saves some gas in case …
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# Handle
pmerkleplant
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
If a caller has privileges for a QuickAccount consisting of two `address(0)`'s,
then the caller can execute arbitrary transactions through t…