Lit Review

[jandresgannon]

Focus less on Afghan, more on alliances/coalition conflict

[jandresgannon]

Olson, Mancur, and Richard Zeckhauser. “An Economic Theory of Alliances.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 48, no. 3 (1966): 266–79. https://doi.org/10.2307/1927082. Some complains that the US shares too much of the burden from NATO and smaller nations contribute very little of their quota Asks "can different sized contributions of different countries be explained in terms of their national interests? Why would it be in the interest of some countries to contribute a larger proportion of their total resources to group undertakings than other countries?" Europe is less able to defend themselves alone so they should be contributing more and they've provided less than they've said is appropriate/in the common interest Purpose of organizations is to serve the common interests of member states which, in the case of NATO, is protections from aggression by a common enemy I argue that there are private interests of member states that are defined by a nation's relative position within the organization. That shapes what they hope to get from the organization and that explains why there are differences in force structure. It's not just about the enemy, but about the friends Organizations provide public/collective foods. Individual interests are typically served by individual action I disagree with the previous point. There are private goods gained from cooperation that are not about external actors (threats) outside of the cooperative agreement, but private goods gained from the nature of the relationship within the agreement In small organizations, individuals have an incentive to make significant sacrifices to obtain the collective good but they will provide suboptimal amounts of this good I think a better way of thinking about this previous point is not amounts of contribution, but the type of contribution. Nations want themselves and others to make different types of contributions to the public good based on what they think the benefits of the relationship are (winning wars vs gaining protection vs restraining opportunism) Theorizes that larger members will bear a disproportionate share of the burden When deciding how large of a military force to contribute to an alliance, you think about the value you place on collective defense and other nondefense goods that you have to sacrifice to obtain additional military forces. In an alliance, the amount you spend on defense is affected by the amount your allies provide. The more your allies spend on defense, the less you have to Eh maybe, there are cases where you don't want your allies to spend more on defense (ally autonomy if their preference alignment is imperfect) Finds that in equilibrium, the larger state (meaning the one that places a higher absolute value on the alliance good) bears a disproportionately large shareof the common burden and they pay a share of the costs that is larger than its share of the benefits Problem with this is it's only thinking about the benefits of an alliance in terms of external threat that the alliance was designed to provide common defense against Why would smaller states have a lower absolute value for defense? Key finding is that the alliance output is always suboptimal when alliance members place a positive value on additional units of defense because each alliance member contributes to the point where its marginal rate of substitution for the alliance good (MRS) equals the marginal cost of the good. Independent national maximization in an alliance means no optimal quantity of the alliance good since they don't share marginal costs in the same proportion in which they share additional benefits "One simplification assumed in the foregoing model was that the costs of defense were constant to scale and the same for all alliance members. Although military forces are composed of diverse types of equipment and manpower, and thus probably vary less both in cost from one country to another and with scale of output than many single products, it is still unlikely that costs are constant and uniform. For some special types of weapon systems there are undoubtedly strik- ing economies of large scale production, and for conventional ground forces there are probably rising costs as larger proportions of a nation's population are called to arms. Because of this latter tendency, a small country can perhaps get a considerable amount of conventional capa- bility with the first few percentiles of its national income. This tends to keep the military expendi- tures of small nations in an alliance above the very low level implied by our constant cost assumption. In any event, cross-country varia- tions in marginal costs should not normally alter the basic conclusions deduced from the model. The differences in the amounts which member nations would be willing to pay for marginal units of an alliance good are typically so great that the cost differentials could hardly negate their effect. Even if there were very large differences in marginal costs among nations, there is no reason to assume that national cost functions would vary systematically with the valuation a country places on alliance forces.'" An elaboration of their finding is that military force in alliance provides non-collective benefits (it's not just about alliance security) that are purely national non-collective benefits. Allied nations may be suspicious of one another and enlarge military forces because they anticipate conflict with one another. In these cases, the degree of suboptimality and important of the disproportionality will deceases since non-collective benefits create an incentive to maintain larger forces (but it's not always about larger forces, but the type of forces, and also larger allies have a say in what forces you have). This leads to a paradoxical conclusion that a decline in unity/commonality of interest doesn't mean an alliance is less effective since that can produce a greater ratio of private to collective benefits (but this is still measuring alliance effectiveness by external threats and assumes that contributing more forces makes a better alliance but meh) This view of alliances argues that summing alliance capabilities together can make it so nations enjoy more military security and lower defense costs not only because of deterrence but because it makes greater security economically feasible and desirable so both nations are better off (but what are the non-security benefits of alliances?) Makes an odd simplying assumption that alliance members don't take into account the reactions of other members to the size of their alliance contributions. That seems crazy. They argue that strategic bargaining interactions don't happen in alliances the way they happen in oligopolistic industries because alliances are irreversible and because alliances are non-market groups so they strive for a larger membership since they provide collective goods *Also argues that even when strategic interaction is important in alliances, smaller countries benefit from that because the larger country loses more with withholding the alliance contribution since it values a given amount of alliance force more highly (the actors in the alliance are trying to get different things)

Morrow, James D. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances.” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991): 904–33. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111499. It's not that allies both receive security from an alliance, but that one receives autonomy benefits and the other security benefits. There is a trade-off between autonomy and security Asymmetric alliances are easier to form and last longer The greater the chance in individual capabilities, the more likely the alliance will be broken Second-rank major powers are more likely to form asymmetric alliances as their capabilities increase Dominant view sees alliances as tools for aggregating capabilities against a threat and as such the need for an alliance ends when the threat passes. This view started with balance of power theory (Morgenthau 1973, Waltz 1979) and it emphasizes how alliances advance the common interests of their members This paper instead argues that great powers use alliances to further their pursuit of changes in the foreign policy squo. Weaker parties offer concessions like military bases or coordination of foreign and domestic policies that increase the strong ally's freedom of action while increasing their protection from external threats. A nation judges the attractiveness of an alliance by comparing the benefits of the ally's ability to advance its interests to the costs of advancing the ally's interests. When the former exceeds the latter, they create an alliance Altfeld (1984) argues for a RCT of military alliances that's about the trade-off between security and autonomy This model shows why alliances are more likely to break when allies' capabilities change (Berkowitz 1983). My argument is the opposite, that allies' capabilities are likely to change when the alliance breaks An alliance/alignment is when 2 or more nations agree to coordinate their actions. Formal alliances are different than alignments because there is more of a formal mutual commitment. An alliance is a way of signaling that you share certain interests and are thus likely to coordinate your actions in the future International affairs is about the manifestation of disagreements on values across nations National preferences, strategies, and the outcome of issues are defined by 1) ideal points that reflect national preferences over the issues 2) positions that specify national strategies to achieve those preferences and 3) the status quo that is the outcome determined by all nations' positions. The squo is a combination of all nations' positions and their capabilities to affect the outcomes. Nations evaluate the squo by comparing it to their ideal point. All nations are dissatisfied with the squo over some issues. Security is about maintaining the squo (the current resolution of the issues it wishes to preserve). Autonomy is about changing the squo (degree to which you can pursue desired changes) There is a trade-off between autonomy and security and alliances can be considered by how they affect those 2 things. States have convex preferences so a moderate combination of both is preferred to an imbalance (convex because of diminishing marginal returns) An alliance that reduces a nation's autonomy will have to garner security benefits My argument: is there a trade-off between security and autonomy? Is it the same for large and small countries? Is there a third element to this trade-off? How and where does force structure fit in? Is my argument that how countries feel about this trade-off (what countries hope to get out of an alliance) explains their force structure and as alliances change their force structure will change because that alliance has dictate the kind of force structure they should have for their own autonomy, for defense, and for constraints on the actions of their allies? Altfeld (1984) has a model of consumer choice theory that argues states employ arms and alliances as tools to gain combinations of autonomy, security, and wealth they desire. Different nations will acquire different combinations of arms and alliances based on their utility for each of these 3 goods (purchasing arms raises your security at the cost of some wealth, forming alliances raises security at the cost of some autonomy (maybe, alliances can increase your autonomy if they constraint the actions of your ally), etc) Benefits of alliances - security benefits from the military capabilities of an ally (depends on their location, the issues the agreement covers, threat other nations pose, etc). Autonomy benefits from cooperating with countries that share a common interest in changing the squo like the Axis during WWII Cost of alliances - security costs from revealing issue positions other nations object to or committing you to defend an ally you would not otherwise defend (entrapment in Snyder 1984) This way of thinking about autonomy seems different than mine. Part of the issue for me seems to be about how you gain autonomy/security by reducing the autonomy of your alliance partner since the presence of that alliance effects your and their force structure. Alliances allow for the creation of complementary force structures that have security and wealth benefits for both sides but that also give the strong side more foreign policy autonomy because they can dictate how those things happen. Morrow argues that control over your alliy's internal and external policies can produce autonomy benefits, but I need to think more about this Minor powers will try to form alliances that increase security at some cost of autonomy which depends on how much they trade for each and their relative important for each of those 2 goods Major powers can make alliances with other major powers to raise their security at the cost of autonomy or can form alliances with minor powers that reduce its security but raise their autonomy because of concessions made by the minor power to secure the alliance An asymmetric alliance is one where the parties receive different benefits from the allaince and these are typically cases where they have asymmetric capabilities 2 major poewrs will form an alliance where their interests are sufficiently close such that they both gain security (interest in preserving the squo matches) or they both gain autonomy (interests in changing the squo complement one another) Key thing seems to be that for Morrow, security is defined by preserving the squo and autonomy is defined by changing it and that's why these things trade-off Nations will break alliances where there is 1) a deterioration of security or autonomy within the alliance 2) improvement of security or autonomy outside of the alliances and 3) shift in the nation's utility function Hypotheses are that asymmetric alliances will last longer than symmetric ones, that an alliance is more likely to be broken over as member's capabilities increase over time My hypothes are related but I am arguing that alliances influence member capabilities, not that member capabilities influence alliances. Both are clearly true, so I have to deal with endogeneity here Powerful states have extra security that they are always willing to trade for more autonomy (you offer to defend another state/protect their desired squo because you want more autonomy/ability to change the squo). But how do you get that from this? What about when there is tension on those fronts? Test this with 164 military alliances between 1815 and 1965 using COW mutual military alliances and wartime alliance data from Holsti et al 1973. Each alliance is treated as a whole Classify alliances as symmetric or asymmetric based on major power definitions in COW (US and SU are superpowers) BoP theory says alliances are used to offset growing powers and restore the balance (Morgenthau 1973) which would mean that alliances are nonideological and last as long as the immediate threat (capability aggregation model) Power transition theory (Organski 1968, Organski and Kugler 1980) posits that the dominant states forms a large alliance with lesser powers that share its ideology and states not in this coalition form alliances to overthrow the existing order which would mean that alliances are ideological and long-lasting Balancing is allying against a threat and bandwagoning is allying with a threat (Walt 1985, 1987) Burden sharing lit is Beer 1972, Murdoch and Sandles 1982, Olson and Zechkauser 1965 and argues that security is a public good in an alliance and each member will try to free ride in an alliance so large states bear an excess of the burden *"What should be contentious in asymmetric alliances is the composition of military forces, not the distribution of military expenditure. The dominant nation wants alliance forces configured to advance its autonomy interests rather than the security of the alliance. When autonomy and security interests demand different force structures, we should expect to see conflict in asymmetric alliances over the appropriate force structure. In symmetric alliances burden sharing should not be a great problem because each nation wishes to increase its security and is capable of making a significant contribution to its own security. Consequently, neither ally will be interested in free riding on the alliance." My argument is that alliances affect your composition of military forces! Asymmetric alliances are a tool that hegemons use to extend their control over the international system. Part of how they do this is by influencing the force structure of their allies in ways that give the hegemon control. Think about the role that preference alignment plays here. Morrow argues that hegemons provide allies with security from their neighbors and receive control over allies' policies and strategic locations to advance their interests (I am making a contribution about the force structure part of this.

**Bennett,Andrew, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger. “Burden-Sharing in thePersian Gulf War.” International Organization 48, no. 1 (ed1994): 39–75.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300000813. Puzzle is why dostates contribute to alliances? Most people think relative sizedetermines contributions, but could also be perception of threat,dependence on other alliance members, and doemsticinstitutions Looks at burdensharing among the 6 contributors to Operation Desert Storm(Britain, Egypt, France, Germany, Japan, and the US Externally-drivehypotheses: collective action, balance of threat, alliancedependence Internally-drivenhypotheses: state autonomy and domestic politics plus bureaucraticpolitics Method ismost-likely case for each hypo using a disciplinced-configurativestudy meaning they use theories to interpret cases rather than theother way around Finding is thatexternal pressures explain political leaders' incentives tocontributr but internal constraints better account for the abilityto contribute and the form those contributions take Alliancedependence better explains behavior than collective action andbalance of threat hypotheses Collectionaction: smaller states contribute less since they gain less andexpect large states to provide more (arg provided on Olson andZeckhauser economic theory of alliances). Hypothesis here is thatdominant states (measured by economic size and military spending)will pay disproportionately to secure goods. When states don't freeride, that requires explanation Balance ofthreat: states balance against threats as well as power so thosefacing the gravest threats will pay the most in proportion to thenational product (operationalize threat as exposure to Iraqimilitary capabilities and dependence on oil) Alliancedependence: states in alliances face fears of abandonment andentrapment. The alliance security dilemma is that reducing one ofthese risks increases the other, strong commitments to your allyreduce the risk of abandonment but increase the risk of entrapment.You support an ally when the dependence pressure outweighs fear ofentrapment so the more dependent a state is on the US, the more itshould have contributed to ODS. States that fear entrapment morethan abandonment should have offered non-military help, had limitedmilitary commitments, or contributed air or naval more than groundforces. Measure dependence on the US in terms of military oreconomic ties that would be hard to replace. They see countriesmaking contributions unrelated to the immediate threat as anexample of US arm twisting State autonomyand domestic society: when leader preferences differ from those ofthe public, the state will contribute only when they canautonomously mobilize resources for specific kinds ofcontributions. That is determined by their constitutional structureand societal norms about the propert sphere of governmentalactivity. Leaders will contribute in response to pressure from analliance leader unless domestic opposition is overwhelming andleaders won't win public support in issue-areas where they lackautonomy and their views differ from that of the public Bureaucraticpolitics: government actions are compromises from beaucraticbargaining and officials' views on policy issues are shaped bytheir organizational role like how much they care aboutorganizational autonomy, influence, maintenance of core missions,etc "The Bush administrationpublicized its specific expectations for each ally'scontribution in late August; a week later Deputy Secretaryof State Lawrence Eagleburgerand Treasury Secretary Nicholas Bradyvisited allied capitals to securesupport.33 Congress also pressed U.S. allies:unhappy with the extent of Japan'scontribution, in September the House voted 370to 53 to pass an amendment,which did not become law, requiring Japan to payall costs of U.S. troopsstationed there (in Japan).34 Such actions, combinedwith the public's insistencethat allies share the burden, made credible theimplicit threat that the UnitedStates would abandon the objective of liberatingKuwait if its allies did notcontribute." 33. See Patrick Tyler andDavid Hoffmann, "U.S. Asking Allies to Share the Costs,"Washington Post, 30 August 1991, p.Al; and Alan Riding, "U.S. Officials Begin Tour to Seek FinancialBacking for Gulf Force," The NewYork Times, 5 September 1990. 34. R. W. Apple, "Bonn andTokyo are Criticized for Not Bearing More of Gulf Cost," TheNew York Times, 13 September1990, p. Al. "Second, Egyptian dependenceon the United States was important.Between 1979,the year of the Camp David Accords, and 1984 Egypt bought over$7 billion of U.S. arms oncredit, becoming the second-largest recipient,after Israel, of U.S. economicassistance. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait gave Egypta small amount ofcountervailing leverage over the United States: it wasin Washington's interest thatEgypt be a visible part of the coalition to showthat Saudi Arabia was not theonly major Arab member. Perhaps with this inmind, a Bush administrationinteragency group convened in August 1990 toconsider rescheduling Egypt'sAmerican debt.74 On 1 September, Bush announcedhis desire, subject tocongressional approval, to forgive all of Egypt's$7-billion debt. It took House andSenate conferees almost two months to approvethis, during which time a Caironewspaper editorialized that one "lesson" ofthe episode was a need to avoiddependence on outsiders.75 Mubarak claimedthat "we have not taken anyfinancial aid from anybody just to stand by them."76By early October Egypthad fourteen thousand troops in the Persian Gulf, andthe rest arrived inearly January 1991.77 74. See Claiborne, "Mubarak Sets Summit, SeeksAll-Arab Force"; and Tyler, "Bush toForgive $7.1 BillionEgypt Owes for Military Aid." 75. Jamal Badawi, "Lessons from the UnitedStates," Cairo Al-Wafd, 29 September 1990, p. 1,in FBIS-NES 4 October1990, p. 9. It should be noted that this newspaper was not part ofthe semi-officialEgyptian press. 76.Claiborne, "Mubarak Sets Summit, Seeks All-ArabForce." 77. See EdwardCody, "Arabs Reaffirm Limited Role," Washington Post, 9 October1990, p. A12; and"Against Iraq," The Economist. As we note below, few Egyptiansobjected to aiding the Saudis; it was fighting fellow Arabs alongwith Westerners that aroused opposition. Thus,once Mubarak decidedto oppose Saddam, he publicly demonized the Iraqi leader; seeFreedman and Karsh,The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991, p. 98. Still, many Egyptian elites sawthe conflict as an opportunity to reassert influence in the Arabworld after being isolated after the CampDavid Accords. SeeGlenn Frankel, "Egypt's Alliance Role Meets Minimal Dissent,"Washington Post, 18 February 1991, p. Al. "TheBush administration did not fail to exploit this leverage overJapanese behavior.U.S. officials repeatedly played "good cop" to the congressional"bad cop," the latterof which involved threatened the U.S. security commitmentto 115Japan should theJapanese make only a meager contribution. TheU.S. ambassador inTokyo noted a possible link between Japan's willingnessto participate in themultinational coalition and a future permanent seat onthe UN SecurityCouncil.116 He lobbied leading Japanese officials andpoliticians intensively, and the Japanese governmentitself referred frequently in the Diet to the need to avert damage to Japan'srelationship with the United States.117 These pressures ultimately sufficed toovercome opposition party and popular resistance. Japan's dilemma was captured byThe Economist, which depicted Tokyo as "agonizing over what Japan can dothat will be acceptable at home, not too offensive to oil-producing Arab statesand, above all, make the 118 Americans feel Japan is doing itsbit." 115. LarryNiksch and Robert Sutter, "Japan's Response to the Persian GulfCrisis," CongressionalResearch Service, Library of Congress, 23 May1991. 116. HenryCutter, "Analysts Label Aid Package a 'Policy Mess,' " Japan Times,10-16 September 1990,p. 1. 117. Niksch andSutter, "Japan's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis." See alsoFreedman and Karsh,The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991, p. 122. 118. "Money, Men: All Donations Welcome," TheEconomist, 18 August 1990, p. 24. "Germany's largecontribution—in the face of an apparent opportunityto ride free and inthe absence of a strongly felt Iraqi threat—points to theimpact of alliancedependence. Abundant evidence suggests that the two keyGerman commitments tothe coalition in September and January were motivatedby pressure from theUnited States and German fear of U.S. abandonmentshould Germany fail tocontribute. Much of this evidence also can be interpreted asa two-level game inwhich Kohl let it be known that he was providing aidonly underconsiderable U.S. pressure. The timing of Germany's first pledge inSeptember is revealing in this regard. First, the U.S. Defense Department wasreported on 30 August to be seeking a 132 German contribution of DM1 billion and alsoDM62 million per month.Around this time Kohl spoke with Bush bytelephone and pledged aid but emphasized that the costs of Germanunification and German aid to the Soviet Union limited Germany's resources.133 Next,after Baker and the U.S. Senate (by a unanimous resolution) had called formore burden-sharing by U.S. allies, Baker spoke in Germany on 15 September withGenscher and Kohl. Immediately after meeting Baker, Kohl publiclypledged a total of DM3.3 billion in aid to Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and the UnitedStates.134 Numerous German and foreign press reports attributed this to weeksof U.S. pressure and German concern that the U.S. Congress might delayapproval of the German unification 135 treaty if Germany did not give aid.Kohl's 30January announcement of more aid to the coalitionfollowed similarmaneuvers. Members of Congress had criticized Germany's shirkingof alliance burdens inearly January.136 After Baker spoke with Kohland Genscher inGermany on 8 January, German spokesperson DieterVogel admitted thatKohl had promised Baker more financial aid andmilitary equipment.137Finally, after talks with British Foreign Secretary Hurd on30 January, Kohl gavea speech to the Bundestag announcing $5.5 billionin further aid to thecoalition. In doing so, he stated that Germany's allieswere "makingsacrifices," that the United States had contributed to Germany'sunity and freedom, andthat a united Germany had more responsibility as wellas 138 more freedom ofaction. 132. PatrickE. Tyler and David Hoffman, "U.S. Asking Allies to Share theCosts," Washington Post, 29 August 1990, p.Al. 133. HorstSchreitter-Schwarzenfeld, "Baker to Request Money," FrankfurterRundschau 1 September1990, p. 4, in FBIS-WEU 7 September, p. 9. 134. Hamburg DPA broadcast 15 September 1990,in FBIS-WEU 17 September 1990, pp. 8-9. 135. Cologne Deutschlandfunk broadcast 17September 1990, in FBIS-WEU 18 September 1990, pp. 10-11. See also Freedman and Karsh,The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991, p. 120; and"A Strange and MotleyArmy," The Economist 22 September 1990, p.46. 136. See, forexample, members of Congress quoted in Mossberg, Lehner, and Kempe,"Some in U.S. Ask WhyGermany, Japan Bear so Little of GulfCost." 137. HamburgDPA broadcast 11 January 1991, in FBIS-WEU 11 January 1991, pp.10-11. 138. MunichBayerischer Rundfunk broadcast 30 January 1991, in FBIS-WEU 31January 1991, pp.5-7. DV is contribution outcomes: 1) free ride - perceive securityas a public good but don't contribute. Happens when you thinkothers will provide enough security without your contribution andyou are not dependent on those in the alliance 2) keep yourdistance - if you neither share the public good nor contribute.Happens when you do not depend on coalition members 3) reveal yourpreferences and pay up - if you share in the public good and fearit will be undersupplied (US during Guld War) 4) entrapped andforced to pay anyway - happens for those that don't highly valuethe public good which happens for highly dependent states EV is that which of these 4 options a state chooses isdetermined by state autonomy, societal preferences, andbureaucratic politics. The form of the contribution (military oreconomic) is determined by these domestic variables Alliance dependence lengthens the shadow of the future forvulnerable allies. When the US anticipates free riding, it preemptsit by exercising leverage over other coalition members or implyingthat Congress might do so I disagree with the previous point. The contributions the USseeks are those that do not affect how the war is conducted or givethe other actors say over the options, it's a token contributionthat serves the ally more than the US. Looking at what countriescontribute elucidates this *Their argument is that allience dependence accounts for someincentives to contribute to security coalitions, but not the mix ofmilitary, economic, and diplomatic contributions that you make.Domestic autonomy and bureaucratic politics are needed to explainthis variation

Boyer, Mark A. “A Simple and Untraditional Analysis of Western Alliance Burden‐sharing.” Defence Economics 1, no. 3 (May 1, 1990): 243–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/10430719008404665. We assume most countries in alliances will free ride on the largest member There is more equitable burden sharing in alliances than Olsen and Zeckhauser assume *Explanation for this is there are other benefits you gain from an alliance that are not just about security and things other than security matter a lot more now because of globalization (economic and diplo ties) Examples from other papers about benefits from alliances are domestic issues (Barnett and Levy 1991) and trade and interdependence (Powers 2004). That could explain why you don't free ride/get paradoxical looking security "benefits" from joining a fight. You might expect that state to defend you later, but unlikely. What is more likely is that the state will repay you in other ways

Ward, Hugh, and HanDorussen. “Standing alongside Your Friends: Network Centrality andProviding Troops to UN Peacekeeping Operations.” Journal of PeaceResearch 53, no. 3 (May 1, 2016):392–408.https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316628814. Why docountries contribute troops to UN peacekeeping given they can freeride? It has to be because of private benefits of providingtroops Explanatinis that you prefer to deploy peacekeepers alongside countries withsimilar foreign policy preferences to maximize jointly producedprivate benefits so your willingness to provide peacekeepersdepends on what other countries are providingpeacekeepers Findingsis that in equilibrium, countries that are more Bonacich central(eigenvector centrality) in a network of foreign policy preferencecontribute disproportionately to UN peacekeeping. Policycomplementarity explains why countries provide a larger proportionof peacekeepers to a particular mission There is adownside to peacekeeping being a hegemonic imposition of values asopposed to a global responsibility with a fair share of the burdenbecause when a small number of countries shoulder the financialburden, those larger shareholders pursue an agenda in keeping withtheir preferences The above is my argument,that in war the powerful countries want to be able to pursue anagenda in keeping with their preferences so they ensure that theircontributions in terms of types of technologies are ones thatenable that and their allies contribute things that don't give themleverage over the agenda of the conflict Leaders may find it easier to garner domestic support for peaeckeeping missions if alliesjoin in. Smaller countries may get foreign policy advantages from contributing to an operation but only if a major power favors it and supports it with troops The similarities of foreign policy preferences within the group of countries that provide peacekeepers determines the benefits of complementarities Country i is more strongly linked witht country j if i's private benefit goes up with j's level of participation In equilibrium, contributions are proportional to a country's Bonacich centrality in the complementarities network where you have greater centrality if you have more direct and indirect connections with other countries Network game cites Jackson 2008, Chyzh 2016, Gallop 2016, Larson 2016 When countries have shared objectives because they are like-minded, they will be incentivized to contribute peacekeepers because it provides private benefits. These complementarities between policy preferces of those participating in peacekeeping constitute a network. It affects how much you contribute to peacekeeping because it affects domestic support, the ability to achieve the outcome because of implementation coordination One country's benefit from peacekeep derives from not only whether it acts, but it acts alongside some ally j. So your utility is a function of the contributions of each other country in the system There is a relative complementarity in producing private goods via peacekeeping jointly with other countries My arg here is that there is relative complementarity in producing private goods via fighting jointly with other countries. For some, that private good is the conflict outcome, for others the private goods are derived from that joint fighting improving the quality of the relationship tie There are cases where the positive complementarity in joint production of private benefits outweigh the disincentives to contribute because of free riding My innovation/contribution to the bandwagoning lit is demonstrating that there is variation in what you contribute based on the benefits you hope to get out of the joint warfighting. It's not just that you help out your ally when your concern is the quality of the relationship as opposed to the conflict outcome, is that there are better and worse ways to do that. The same is true for countries that want to win the war, there are certain things they contribute that are better for accomplishing that outcome. That, along with other things, influenced what the smaller countries contribute. You don't want other countries to contribute certain things that give them more veto power/influence over the conduct of the war if your preferences for strategy differ or if you think they'll get the credit Hypothesis is that similarity of policy preferences explains why contributions to peacekeeping operatioms have positive or negative complementarities. If i and j have similar foreign policy preferences, they each get higher private-goods payoffs from participating in peacekeeping when the other is involved. When countries have similar foreign policy preferences, they will strive to achieve compatible objectives during impelmentation of the mission and support each other's peacekeepers "Hypothesis: Other things being equal, the proportion of troops a country contributes to the overall numbersinvolved in a UN peacekeeping mission increases with its Bonacich centrality in network G" Degree of similarity in foreign policy preferences is used with UN voting behavior data Data is 35 UN peacekeeping missions from 1990-2011 where each unit of country contributions to a mission in a particular year. Look at contri utions of military personnel DV is proportional (your contribution to a particular mission in a given year divided by the total number of troops participating in a particular mission in the year concerned) More interested in the proportion of troops rather than the raw amount EV is foreign policy preference similarity measured by UN votes frol Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten Hypothesis amounts to the idea that countries that share policy preference with ideologically moderate countries provide higher proportions of peacekeepers than ideologically extreme ones. This is explained by jointly produced private benefits Most current work focuses on absolute troop level contributions rather than proportionate contributions in equilibrium, so there's not a lot to go on here. Absolute amount shouldn't affect the proportion of troops sent by any one country so even though more intense conflicts have more overall troops, that shouldn't affect the ratio Weighted distance control which is distance between urban agglomerations in each country weighted by the population of these agglomerations (Mayer and Zignago 2011) Ongoing commitments to other missions constrain the ability of countries to deploy peacekeepers to further missions but is also a measure of general commitment to peacekeeping I need a control for ongoing commitments to other military missions Maybe control for historical colonial legacy or whether the 2 countries were colonies of the same country during that period. Smaller countries may be less likely to provide peacekeepers for operations than big countries so we need the ratio of populations Provides a visual representation of the relationship between policy centrality and the proportion of total number of troops deployed in a mission-year contributed by a country. Relationship seems positive but non-linear suggesting there are a lot of factors at play Difference of means test explores whether it clusters. Looks at the mean absolute difference between ideal points for a random sample of pairs Baseline model has the eigen score and eigen squared to capture non-linearities. Also wealth and weighted distance to control for private financial incentives to provide peacekeepers and the salience of regional instability "The Woolridge test for autocorrelation in panel data confirms the need to control for autocorrelation (prob > F ¼ .000). Accordingly, the models give GLS estimates allowing for an AR(1) process. Model 1 further assumes random effects for contributing country, mission, and year." Model 2 has contributor country fixed effects. Finds that countries contribute a larger proportion of peacekeepers if they are more centrally located in the policy-preference network but the effect is non-linear Oddly, for the ongoing commitments control they find that countries contribute a larger share of their peacekeepers when they are simultaneously deploying to other missions. That could be because it signals a general willingness to engage with UN peacekeeping Conclusion is that the key insight is that countries provide a larger proportion of peacekeepers to a particular mission if they are more central in a network of policy preferences

Ashraf, A. S. M. Ali. “The Politics of Coalition Burden-Sharing: The Case of the War in Afghanistan.” Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2011. http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/7898/. Looks at contributions of UK, Germany, and Pakistan during Afghan war (2001-2010) to understand coalition burden sharing Uses neo-classical realist model that international systemic incentives and constraints are channeled through domestic political and culture-induced processes to produce unique burden-sharing behaviors for states. My theoretical model examines the effect of three systemic variables – alliance dependence, balance of threat, and collective action; and three domestic level variables – domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability – in explaining the politics of coalition burden-sharing. GB was strong support, Germany only did peacekeeping in peaceful places, and Pakistan did nothing directly GB had alliance solidarity with the US so they contributed a lot. They also cared about the balance of threat Germany was risk-averse, had domestic constraints, and has a useless military Pakistan contributed because dependent on informal alliance with the US and to keep getting foreign aid *Domestic factors influenced GB and Germany decisions. They were not influenced by pressure of an incentive from the US

Haesebrouck, Tim. “Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes Against Islamic State: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” Foreign Policy Analysis, 2016, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw035. Those coalition partners who participated in air strikes against ISIS were those that had a strong interest in good relations with the US, saw terrorism as a large threat, and had low levels of parliamentary involvement *Part of this is the same as our arg, that states that want good relations with the US do more costly contributions Our arg: It's not true here that states are joining these alliances to balance against threats since they are opting into a threat that would not otherwise exist. Balance of threat cites are Walt 1987, Sandler and Shimizu 2014) Davidson 2011 looks at "alliance value" and argues that you support an ally when you can leverage their power in outcomes in your favor. Ringsmose 2010 agrees that some NATO countries focus on the collective defense part because they think Russia is coming back while others think they have a special relationship with the US that gives them international clout. Distinction here is about whether the alliance with the US is good for your protection or for your international influence

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Whether you contribute to air strikes against ISIS is determined by alliance politics, threat perception, and domestic institutional constraints Threat posed by foreign fighters and a strong interest in good relations with the US predict air strike participation and parliamentary involvement in military decisions predicts low air strike participation Balance of threats hypo holds that you enter into alliances to balance against threats (Walt 1987) Figure out what was the threat from Afghan to code what countries would have felt a high level of threat Snyder (1984) is about how in an alliance countries have to balance fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment. Your choice in the alliance security dilemma is determined by your relative dependence on the ally Davidson (2011) says its about alliance value not alliance dependence because there are cases where you can leverage an ally's power in outcomes in your favor (this is part of my 2nd variable, maybe) "States might thus value their alliance with the United States because they are dependent on the United States’ security guarantee or perceive a special relationship with Washington. While “Article 5ers” perceive contributions to NATO or US-led operations as “a fee to obtain American protection,” “Atlanticists” considerer it “the price of political influence” (Ringsmose 2010, 332)."Measured threat by whether a country had experience terrorist attacks/had foreign fighters in their country *This measure seems bad but is worth looking at: "Two conditions are included that reflect expectations on alliance politics: “Alliance Dependence” and “Alliance Value.” The former comprises the states that are dependent on the United States’ security guarantee, the latter the states that perceive a special relationship with Washington. The coding of both conditions builds on scholarly literature, which is very consistent on which states show a strong interest in a good relationship with the United States (cf. Howorth 2007, 146–160; Græger and Haugevik 2009; Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013)."

Haesebrouck, Tim. “National Behaviour in Multilateral Military Operations.” Political Studies Review, April 19, 2016, 1478929915616288. https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929915616288. Review of 4 books on the issue of what explains national behavior in multilateral military operations Key foundation lit is the Bennett article. Bennett 97 argue contribution to the Desert Storm Coalition were determined by collective action, balance of threat, and allied dependence Collective action (Olsen and Zeck 1966) argue that since the US made a large up front contribution, other states should free ride but we don't see countries free riding which is what is puzzling (Davidson 2011 'America's allies make rather costly contributions when they could have taken a free ride off American military might'). My arg us what our acquintances make costly contributions when they could have taken a security free ride. Mello (2011) finds evidence confirming collective action but looks at absolute levels of military support, not disproportionate contributions. When small states don't contribute, it's not necessarily free riding since they just might not be able to contribute anything. We don't have any evidence to refute this hypothesis Balance of threat is a different explanation that states that are the most threatened by the war will carry a higher share of the war's burden (again, looking at absolute level of share) (Bennett 1997). Baltrusaitis 2010 finds similar conclusions and Davidson 2011 finds this is the single most important factor in explaining contributions to US-led operations. The difference in findings is explained by how they consider threats, Davidson has the broadest definition. Davidson also correctly noted that states facing a threat can free ride if the US can deal with that threat on its own but they don't do that since contributions are politically good (Milosevic needed to see NATO unity) and its good for prestige **Alliance politics is Snyder 1984's explanation based on his "alliance security dilemma" where the states that are the most dependent on US security will carry a high burden in US-led operations (different than our arg. Ours is that countries that want to more dependent/more tied in with the US will do this. Those who are already locked in/have confidence in US security will free ride). Bennett 1997 say this is the most convincing explanation for a lack of free riding during the Gulf War. Baltrusaitis shows this was also true during the Iraq War, proven by SK (SK not quite our example, their proportional share was likely not as high). I disagree with the way Davidson thinks about it in terms of "alliance value" because that's about present value, not trying to alter future expectations of value which is the distinction. States that have a high, but stable current alliance value won't necessarily over-contribute. It's those with a shaky alliance value that will. This is our contribution. Davidson points to high UK support as proof and says that the UK did it because Blair wanted greater influence over US foreign policy. The "greatER" part is what they underexplain Domestic explanations include preferences of political leaders which is accounted for via historical learning and the personal experience of leaders (Auerswald and Saideman 2014). Hard to know though because leader research is tough. Political ideology could also play a role since left leaning leaders are more wary of war (Mello 2014) but that depends on historical experiences so its hard to say (Rathbun 2004). Domestic institutions like parliamentary veto power (Mello 2014)but there is no clear pattern here. It could be about bargaining between parties so whether you are a coalition government makes a difference (Auerswald and Saideman 2014) and we do see evidence of that in ISAF. Electoral politics doesn't seem to matter since the party in power's position almost always lines up with the opposition party's position (Davidson 2011)

Haesebrouck, Tim. “Explaining the Member States’ Varying Military Engagements: The Potential of a Strategic Culture Perspective.” Journal of Contemporary European Research 12, no. 3 (August 4, 2016). https://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/733. This article looks at difference in contributions but still makes the mistake of looking at raw count Argues that strategic culture could have something to do with it

Haesebrouck, Tim. “EU Member State Participation in Military Operations: A Configurational Comparative Analysis.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 30, no. 2–3 (March 4, 2017): 137–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2017.1313197. Patterns of military engagement are determined by military resources, competing deployments, UN peacekeeping tradition, and regional trade Idiosyncratic defense culture explanation is given by Biehl 2013, Pohl 2013) but that explanation is annoying Does some qually stuff

Haesebrouck, Tim. “NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 10 (November 1, 2017): 2235–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715626248. Leftist parties had more support for Libya war and contributed if they had resources and either valued the alliance with the US highly or were not facing elections soon Right wing parties had more support for the Libya war only when that country's interests were threatened or their participation was vital to mission success "Jakobsen and Møller (2012, 109, 112) argue that Denmark considered the war in Libya as an opportunity to demonstrate its ‘‘relevance and trustworthiness to its great power allies in NATO, especially the United States.’’" *Troop contributions are a better measure of punching above your weight because casualties matter more than spending for out of area operations (Ringsmose 2010) and risking civilian casualties is also costly (Chivvis 2014) Another way to measure military burden is deployed troops/GDP Agrees that casualties are a reason that troop counts can be used to evaluate the burden an ally has faced in contributing to the war, but just gives a score above 0.5 if they bombed since there was a higher risk of military casualties there. Gives the US and UK a 1 since they did the most air sorties, give Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and Norway a 1 since they did less but proportional to size, Italy gets a 0.8 since it started late, Netherlands and Spain get 0.4 since they didn't attack ground targets Codes alliance value with the US as a binary. 1 = Eastern Europe and Norway since they care about Russia threat, as well as Canada, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom because they are Atlanticists He argues France and the UK had the highest burden of strikes because they 1/3 and 1/5 of the air strikes despite being 8 and 7% of NATO's GDP but that's why measuring it that way doesn't make sense for our theory. That doesn't tell us that the strikes were more costly to them than other states that did strikes. A counterexample is the quote ‘In the Libya operation, Norway and Denmark, have provided 12 per cent of allied strike aircraft yet have struck about one third of the targets’, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates noted in June 2011, ‘These countries have, with their constrained resources, found ways to do the training, buy the equipment, and field the platforms necessary to make a credible military contribution’. If we plot it as raw contributions the way he has, then yes it is just linear with collective action because it's just size of country. Bigger states contribute more. But our theory shows it's non-linear if you view it as relative contributions because then you see how much a country sacrificed and there we don't see collective action, we see acquintnces giving more than close friends. "This path covers Denmark and Norway, whose contributions have been attributed to a desire to demonstrate their reliability and dedication to NATO (Jakobsen and Møller 2012, 112; Dicke et al. 2013, 41)."

Haesebrouck, Tim, and Alrik Thiem. “Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations.” Defence and Peace Economics 0, no. 0 (May 5, 2017): 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1320183. Looks at disproportionate military humanitarian aid operations by Europe Look at different unit types since they have different levels of risk "staff, medical, logistic and combat unit-dominated contingents" but just gives them all arbitrary numbers

Davidson, Jason. “Heading for the Exits: Democratic Allies and Withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan.” Democracy and Security 10, no. 3 (July 3, 2014): 251–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2014.946017. Military deployments are costly and there are often domestic pressures to withdraw Withdraw becomes more likely when the opposition party wants it Withdraw is less likely when both parties in government value the alliance with the US and they care about the target of the intervention Withdraw becomes more likely if they think there will be no alliance fallout, the target is not a threat, or the US intervention is unlikely to succeed

Gartzke, Erik. “Contracts Between Friends: Alliances, Reputation, and International Politics,” 2012. Friends have less of a need to signal an alignment by forming an alliance The logic of our paper is consistent with this. Acquaintances do have a need to signal an alignment by forming an alliance "Alliances and reputations are substitutes; to the degree that a_nities are already understood, states with reputations as fast friends should have less need to ally."

Gibler, Douglas M. “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3 (June 1, 2008): 426–54. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002707310003. States that honor their alliance commitments are more likely to get allies in the future because they are seen as reliable. Reputation matters

Gibler, Douglas, and Toby Rider. “Prior Commitments: Compatible Interests versus Capabilities in Alliance Behavior.” International Interactions 30, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 309–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620490883985. There is a curvilinear relationship between interest alignment and formal alliances. Once your interests are super aligned you don't need a formal alliance

Hallams, Ellen, and Benjamin Schreer. “Towards a ‘Post-American’ Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya.” International Affairs 88, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 313–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01073.x. There was more NATO burden sharing in Libya because the US has less tolerance for free riding

Hlatky, Stéfanie von, and Justin Massie. “Ideology, Ballots, and Alliances: Canadian Participation in Multinational Military Operations.” Contemporary Security Policy 0, no. 0 (August 14, 2018): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2018.1508265. There are domestic influences like electoral considerations that matter more than ideological ones in explaining why countries join coalitional conflicts

Keohane, Robert O. “The Big Influence of Small Allies.” Foreign Policy, no. 2 (1971): 161–82. https://doi.org/10.2307/1147864. Perspective back then was that the US was the hub power and we had a bunch of small allies that extended the reach of our policy, although it became difficult to control them Small allies that are very dependent on the US have still been able to influence US policy Small states have bargaining leverage because they can act recalcitrant - even if they defect/free ride it doesn't matter so they can take the alliance institution for granted (my arg is we see this for some countries but not others). He argues this requires the small state to develop a relationship of mutual dependence but that's not the pattern we see

Krebs, Ronald R., and Jennifer Spindel. “Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention.” Security Studies 0, no. 0 (July 9, 2018): 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1483609. Allies oppose powerful partner's hawkish foreign policy interventions and see it as as reducing credibility about that ally's willingness and ability to defend you Argues that you should not deploy forces to signal to your allies that you will come to their aid when called *Opposite of our arg because about the primary actor doing the reassuring. Ours is a case where rhe weaker actor is doing the assuring, so it's consistent

Kreps, Sarah. “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-Led Operations in Afghanistan.” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 191–215. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00108.x. Public opinion irrelevant for NATO Afghan war since operating through a formal institution like NATO creates incentives for sustained cooperation (elite consensus explanation) *Our paper should show something different. Sure, NATO membership means you won't back out but you'll do the bare minimum that the institution requires without crossing into defection territory. But states that are not bound by that end up doing more

Kupchan, Charles A. “NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior.” International Organization 42, no. 2 (1988): 317–46. US coercion is needed for political cooperation by NATO for outside of Europe operations but the economic parts of NATO (how much is spent) is insensitive to bargaining pressure and determined more by domestic factors

Massie, Justin. “Why Democratic Allies Defect Prematurely: Canadian and Dutch Unilateral Pullouts from the War in Afghanistan.” Democracy and Security 12, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 85–113. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2016.1160222. Democracies are less reliable allies and more likely to pull out (we need a control for democracy, also cite Gartzke and Gledtisch 2004)

Massie, Justin, and Alan Bloomfield. “Democratic Allies’ Followership Patterns: A Constructivist Explanation of Military Support to US-Led Coalition Operations.” Poznan, Poland, 2016. *This paper is on our exact topic, why there are asymmetric contributions to alliance coalitions Bennett 94 found that vulnerable allies contributed to US-led operations because of pressure from the US but less dependent allies like France also contributed Davidson 2011 found dependent allies contribute hoping to exert influence over the US but the empirical results in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and and Iraq are inconsistent **Haesebrouck 2016 and Ringsmose 2010 argue allies support US operations to improve their relationship with the US but only when there were humanitarian concerns in Libya Bennett 94 argues allies contribute when they see a large foreign threat, but Bennett et al 1997 and Baltrusaitis 2010 find that not to be the general case Davidson 2011 found that whether that ally was making a decisive contribution is not a factor Haesebrouck 2016 found spatial proximity to the threat is not a factor that gets allies to intervene early in the conflict and Saideman 2016 found it didn't matter if you had actually been attacked by ISIS when seeing whether you intervened against ISIS Paper argues that strategic culture/identity/shared foreign policy preferences about national interest matter Our finding should disprove them by showing its non-linear

Warren, T. Camber. “The Geometry of Security: Modeling Interstate Alliances as Evolving Networks.” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 6 (November 1, 2010): 697–709. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310386270. Alliances are a costly signal of your intention to cooperate Need to think of these alliances as evolving networks since they are not independent events

Warren, T. Camber. “Modeling the Coevolution of International and Domestic Institutions Alliances, Democracy, and the Complex Path to Peace.” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 3 (May 1, 2016): 424–41. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316633375. Relationship between democracy and alliance coevolves since they influence each other and go in a positive feedback loop