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[aturret]

今天早上自建的突然恢复了一阵，而演示依然失效。看来是反爬严格爬取随缘了。

[TonyRL]

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```rss https://www.economist.com/latest/ RSSHub i@diygod.me (DIYgod) zh-cn Mon, 17 Jul 2023 15:06:47 GMT 5

image: Getty Images

EUROPE, AMERICA and Asia are all enduring scorching heatwaves, air temperatures are repeatedly breaking records and the health impacts are alarming. But is the worst yet to come? Why risky assets are proving more resilient than investors expected despite war, inflation and the threat of recession (10:10). And Europe says farewell to its symbolic small cars (16:50). Runtime: 24 min

Listen on: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Google | TuneIn

For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, try a free 30-day digital subscription by going to www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer

]]> Mon, 17 Jul 2023 10:42:57 GMT /content/urbs0otkm3vu2lr0v3itjfo8k69fvjgb https://www.economist.com/podcasts/2023/07/17/why-heatwaves-are-getting-longer-hotter-and-more-widespread

Asia is home to around 2,300 languages, more than 4.6bn people and myriad cultures and customs. Such diversity is also reflected in its cities. In a ranking of liveability by EIU, our sister company, Asia and Australasia contained some of the world’s least and most pleasant cities in which to live. Karachi, Pakistan lags near the bottom; Melbourne, Australia soars near the top. But most cities in the region had something in common this year—they became relatively more liveable. Asian and Australasian cities together registered the biggest jumps of any region.

Cities have to impress EIU judges in five categories: culture and environment, education, health care, infrastructure, and stability. For a third year, the pandemic contaminated the survey’s results. Covid rules and caseloads eased in Asia and Australasia throughout 2022, which helped bump up scores relative to other regions that lifted restrictions earlier.

More incremental developments are also making Asian cities better places to live. India, for instance, is in the midst of a huge transport upgrade. Fast new trains are surging into Delhi, an expanded metro is zipping across Mumbai and 10,000km of highways are being built across the country each year.

]]> Mon, 17 Jul 2023 00:00:00 GMT /content/phkkqjq2j455o4qf1e279gv5v2r91fj5 https://www.economist.com/espressochart/2023 uncertainty United Nations Democratic Republic of the Congo Ethiopia India Nigeria Pakistan China population growth

image: Lehel Kovács

To understand the impact that artificial intelligence may have on the economy, consider the tractor. Historians disagree about who invented the humble machine. Some say it was Richard Trevithick, a British engineer, in 1812. Others argue that John Froelich, working in South Dakota in the early 1890s, has a better claim. Still others point out that few people used the word “tractor” until the start of the 20th century. All agree, though, that the tractor took a long time to make a mark. In 1920 just 4% of American farms had one. Even by the 1950s less than half had tractors.

Speculation about the consequences of ai—for jobs, productivity and quality of life—is at fever pitch. The tech is awe-inspiring. And yet ai’s economic impact will be muted unless millions of firms beyond Silicon Valley adopt it. That would mean far more than using the odd chatbot. Instead, it would involve the full-scale reorganisation of businesses and their in-house data. “The diffusion of technological improvements”, argues Nancy Stokey of the University of Chicago, “is arguably as critical as innovation for long-run growth.”

The importance of diffusion is illustrated by Japan and France. Japan is unusually innovative, producing on a per-person basis more patents a year than any country bar South Korea. Japanese researchers can take credit for the invention of the qr code, the lithium-ion battery and 3d printing. But the country does a poor job of spreading new tech across its economy. Tokyo is far more productive than the rest of the country. Cash still dominates. In the late 2010s only 47% of large firms used computers to manage supply chains, compared with 95% in New Zealand. According to our analysis, Japan is roughly 40% poorer than would be expected based on its innovation.

France is the opposite. Although its record on innovation is average, it is excellent at spreading knowledge across the economy. In the 18th century French spies stole engineering secrets from Britain’s navy. In the early 20th century Louis Renault visited Henry Ford in America, learning the secrets of the car industry. More recently, former ai experts at Meta and Google founded Mistral ai in Paris. France also tends to do a good job of spreading new tech from the capital to its periphery. Today the productivity gap in France between a top and a middling firm is less than half as big as in Britain.

During the 19th and 20th centuries businesses around the world became more “French”, with new technologies diffusing ever faster. Diego Comin and Martí Mestieri, two economists, find evidence that “cross-country differences in adoption lags have narrowed over the last 200 years.” Electricity swept across the economy faster than tractors. It took just a couple of decades for personal computing in the office to cross the 50% adoption threshold. The internet spread even faster. Overall, the diffusion of technology helped propel productivity growth during the 20th century.

Since the mid-2000s, however, the world has been turning Japanese. True, consumers adopt technology faster than ever. According to one estimate TikTok, a social-media app, went from zero to 100m users in a year. Chatgpt itself was the fastest-growing web app in history until Threads, a rival to Twitter, launched this month. But businesses are increasingly cautious. In the past two decades all sorts of mind-blowing innovations have come to market. Even so, according to the latest official estimates, in 2020 just 1.6% of American firms employed machine learning. In America’s manufacturing sector just 6.7% of companies make use of 3d printing. Only 25% of business workflows are on the cloud, a number that has not budged in half a decade.

Horror stories abound. In 2017 a third of Japanese regional banks still used cobol, a programming language invented a decade before man landed on the moon. Last year Britain imported more than £20m-($24m-) worth of floppy disks, MiniDiscs and cassettes. A fifth of rich-world firms do not even have a website. Governments are often the worst offenders—insisting, for instance, on paper forms. We estimate that bureaucracies across the world spend $6bn a year on paper and printing, about as much in real terms as in the mid-1990s.

Best and the rest

The result is a two-tier economy. Firms that embrace tech are pulling away from the competition. In 2010 the average worker at Britain’s most productive firms produced goods and services worth £98,000 (in today’s money), which had risen to £108,500 by 2019. Those at the worst firms saw no rise. In Canada in the 1990s frontier firms’ productivity growth was about 40% higher than non-frontier firms. From 2000 to 2015 it was three times as high. A book by Tim Koller of McKinsey, a consultancy, and colleagues finds that, after ranking firms according to their return on invested capital, the 75th percentile had a return 20 percentage points higher than the median in 2017—double the gap in 2000. Some companies see huge gains from buying new tech; many see none at all.

Although the economics can sound abstract, the real-world consequences are crushingly familiar. People stuck using old technologies suffer, along with their salaries. In Britain, average wages at the least productive 10% of firms have fallen slightly since the 1990s—even as average wages at the best firms have risen strongly. According to Jan De Loecker of ku Leuven and colleagues, “the majority of inequality growth across workers is due to increasing average wage differences between firms”. What, then, has gone wrong?

Three possibilities explain lower diffusion: the nature of new technology, sluggish competition, and growing regulation. Robert Gordon of Northwestern University has argued that the “great inventions” of the 19th and 20th centuries had a far bigger impact on productivity than more recent ones. The problem is that as technological progress becomes more incremental, diffusion also slows, since companies have less incentive and face less competitive pressure to upgrade. Electricity provided light and energy to power machines. Cloud computing, by contrast, is needed only for the most intensive operations. Newer innovations, like machine-learning, may be trickier to use, requiring more skilled workers and better management.

Business dynamism fell across the rich world in the first decades of the 21st century. Populations aged. Fewer new firms were set up. Workers moved companies less frequently. All this reduced diffusion, since workers spread tech and business practices as they move across the economy.

In industries run or heavily managed by the government, technological change happens slowly. As Jeffrey Ding of George Washington University notes, in the centrally planned Soviet Union innovation was world-beating—think of Sputnik—but diffusion was non-existent. The absence of competitive pressure blunted incentives to improve. Politicians often have public-policy goals, such as maximising employment, that are inconsistent with efficiency. Heavily regulated industries make up a big chunk of Western economies today: such sectors, including construction, education, health care and utilities, account for a quarter of American gdp.

Could ai break the mould, diffusing across the economy faster than other recent technologies? Perhaps. For almost any firm it is easy to dream up a use-case. No more administration! A tool to file my taxes! Covid-19 may have also injected a dose of dynamism into Western economies. New firms are being set up at the fastest pace in a decade, and workers are swapping jobs more often. Tyler Cowen of George Mason University adds that weaker firms may have a particular incentive to adopt ai, because they have more to gain.

ai can also be built into existing tools. Many coders—maybe most—already use ai on a daily basis owing to its integration in everyday coding instruments through Github’s CoPilot. Word processors, including Microsoft Word and Google Docs, will soon roll out dozens of ai features.

Not a dinner party

On the other hand, the biggest benefits from new forms of ai will come when firms entirely reorganise themselves around the new technology; by adapting ai models for in-house data, for example. That will take time, money and, crucially, a competitive drive. Gathering data is tiresome and running the best models fearsomely expensive—a single complex query on the latest version of Chatgpt can cost $1-2. Run 20 in an hour and you have passed the median hourly American wage.

These costs will fall, but it could take years for the technology to become sufficiently cheap for mass deployment. Bosses, worried about privacy and security, regularly tell The Economist that they are unwilling to send their data to modify models that live elsewhere. Surveys of small businesses are not encouraging. One, by GoDaddy, a web-hosting company, suggests that around 40% of those in America are uninterested in ai tools. The technology is undoubtedly revolutionary. But are businesses ready for a revolution? ■

]]> Sun, 16 Jul 2023 17:41:33 GMT /content/es6ksvl35us7lth06omrg2isnl2dqa51 https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/07/16/your-employer-is-probably-unprepared-for-artificial-intelligence

image: André Luís Alves

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine war

]]> Sun, 16 Jul 2023 10:26:02 GMT /content/ph8gfi3gkn83v0p5bigbu0ngm584isl0 https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/07/16/zaporizhia-braces-itself-for-russian-nuclear-tricks

image: Reuters

PART-WAY THROUGH the London premiere of “Oppenheimer”, Christopher Nolan’s blockbuster about the father of the atomic bomb, the film’s stars were conspicuously absent. “We’ve seen them earlier on the red carpet,” Mr Nolan told his audience. “Unfortunately they are off to write their picket signs.” On July 14th the 160,000 members of the ​​Screen Actors Guild and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, better known as SAG-AFTRA, went on strike.

The union represents all kinds of performers, from actors such as Cillian Murphy, the star of “Oppenheimer”, to broadcast journalists and voiceover artists. The contract between SAG-AFTRA and the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers (AMPTP), the negotiating body for the studios, expired on June 30th, but the sides decided to extend negotiations until July 12th. No deal was reached.

On the first morning of the strike, picket lines in Los Angeles and New York swelled with performers. Cars honking their horns in support of picketers could be heard blocks from Netflix’s corporate offices in Hollywood, even above the din of the 101 freeway. Hundreds of picketers marched around the block, carrying signs for SAG-AFTRA and the Writers Guild of America (WGA), the union of screenwriters, who launched their own strike back in May. It is the first time both unions have been on strike at the same time since 1960. “Y’all bankrupt Blockbuster for this?” one placard taunted, referring to a defunct video-rental giant.

Both strikes are a result of the ways in which streaming has upended television and film. Indeed, the writers’ strike has come to be known as the “Netflix strike”. Actors and writers alike claim they can no longer make a living on residuals, or the money they get each time something they worked on is rebroadcast. (How to even define “rebroadcast”, in an era when viewers can binge on their favourite shows and films endlessly?) They complain that the streamers keep viewership data a secret, making it impossible to understand why a show got cancelled, if a series went viral, and whether artists should be asking for more money for hits. “This is a strike of the working-class actor,” says Vanessa Chester, who has been acting since the age of three. “And we’re about to be eradicated.”

The rise of generative AI also has actors worried about being replaced by simulations of themselves. (“ChatGPT suck my D” was another memorable picket sign.) The union alleges that the studios offered to pay actors for one day of work to scan their image and likeness, which they could then use in perpetuity. In a press conference announcing the strike, Fran Drescher, star of the 1990s sitcom “The Nanny” and SAG-AFTRA’s president, was almost quaking with rage. “If we don’t stand tall right now, we are all going to be in trouble. We are all going to be in jeopardy of being replaced by machines.”

How will the strike affect Hollywood? In addition to shutting down television and film production in America, SAG-AFTRA warns members against promoting their projects at film festivals, fan expos, talk shows, premieres and more. If the stoppage stretches into September, the red carpet for the Emmys will be a sorry affair. Cities that depend on film and TV production will also take a hit. When the writers’ guild went on strike for 100 days in 2007 and 2008 the state of California lost $2.1bn. The WGA reckons that their current strike is costing the state $30m a day. But LA’s economy is diverse, and probably quite resilient. Harvard University’s Growth Lab found that the motion-picture and sound-recording industry in Los Angeles in 2021 employed nearly five times more people than comparable global cities. Yet those workers make up less than 2% of the city’s workforce.

Union membership across the country fell to a record low in 2022: just 10.1% of Americans are card-carrying members. But the Hollywood strikes come as labour unrest grows in California, and beyond. In the past year alone, Los Angeles’s school employees (though not teachers) and hotel workers also walked off the job. The Bureau of Labour Statistics counted 23 work stoppages of 1,000 workers or more in 2022, the second-highest number since 2002. If United Parcel Service (UPS) workers walk out starting on August 1st, as they are threatening to do, a ten-day work stoppage could be one of America’s costliest strikes in living memory.

Joe Biden is the most pro-labour president in generations, and would like his ambitious industrial policy to swell the ranks of America’s trade unions. When screenwriters went on strike in May, many worried that Americans would have little sympathy for denizens of Hollywood, but they found solidarity among other unions. For example the Teamsters, the trucking union, refused to cross the WGA’s picket lines to make deliveries to studios.

When your correspondent arrived at Netflix, picketers were still buzzing about an appearance from Ms Drescher that morning, who had come to fill them in on the failed negotiations. Ms Drescher seems quite at home antagonising studio executives. In one sense, she’s been practising for the role of union president for decades. In one episode of “The Nanny” her character, Fran Fine, warns her co-star that he should “never, ever, ever cross a picket line”. ■

]]> Fri, 14 Jul 2023 20:42:31 GMT /content/39cgek8ojsbfkd2k4vmejdmu2ndm8s2c https://www.economist.com/united-states/2023/07/14/an-all-out-strike-brings-hollywood-to-a-halt

image: Getty Images

BY SOME MEASURES, in the aftermath of the pandemic, income inequality in America is either increasing or remaining stubbornly high. On the left, the gap between rich and poor has long been an urgent issue—and more people on the right now agree. As both sides of the aisle look for solutions, they are reaching some surprisingly similar conclusions. What are the proposed answers to economic inequality in America? How likely are they to be taken up?

Economist Thomas Piketty talks us through the state of economic inequality in America and some of the left’s proposals to reduce it. And Oren Cass of American Compass, a think tank, explains a new wave of conservative solutions to inequality.

John Prideaux hosts with Charlotte Howard and Idrees Kahloon.

Runtime: 48 min

You can now find every episode of Checks and Balance in one place and sign up to our weekly newsletter. For full access to print, digital and audio editions, as well as exclusive live events, subscribe to The Economist at economist.com/uspod.

]]> Fri, 14 Jul 2023 17:50:15 GMT /content/hl6jpm457mg789ngrirjalmovq26cfgb https://www.economist.com/podcasts/2023/07/14/what-if-anything-should-be-done-about-economic-inequality