Well, turns out, our beloved TTLocks only work with a black-box gateway from China, and, as you may have guessed, only work phoning to China. You can't use your TTLock inside your LAN or open any TTLock door remotely if the China servers are down or too slow (and they sometimes are). This also means that if one day the servers get shut down (and they eventually will, as do any services), we'll lose the remote functionality, which is useful in many cases.
To try and remedy this issue, this Repo aims to reverse-engineer the TTLock SDK (which processes locally) and get it to work with any Bluetooth-capable device, such as a Raspberry Pi 3 or greater. Wouldn't it be neat to make a RPi as a Gateway for your locks? Or maybe even a simple ESP32. Well, it might not be impossible, but some work still needs to be done.
Please be aware that I've never worked with BL or even BLE, so feel free to fix, and most importantly, expect mistakes!
The Bluetooth lock name consists of the last 6 MAC digits, in inverted order. For instance, the lock with the name "S202F_abcdef" has the MAC "ee:c6:a2:ef:cd:ab".
attr handle: 0x0001, end grp handle: 0x0007 uuid: 00001800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
attr handle: 0x0008, end grp handle: 0x000b uuid: 00001801-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
attr handle: 0x000c, end grp handle: 0x0011 uuid: 00001910-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
attr handle: 0x0012, end grp handle: 0x0015 uuid: 0000180f-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
attr handle: 0x0016, end grp handle: 0x001e uuid: 0000180a-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
attr handle: 0x001f, end grp handle: 0xffff uuid: 00001530-1212-efde-1523-785feabcd123handle: 0x0001, uuid: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0002, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0003, uuid: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0004, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0005, uuid: 00002a01-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0006, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0007, uuid: 00002a04-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0008, uuid: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0009, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x000a, uuid: 00002a05-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x000b, uuid: 00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x000c, uuid: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x000d, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x000e, uuid: 0000fff4-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb *
handle: 0x000f, uuid: 00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0010, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0011, uuid: 0000fff2-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb *
handle: 0x0012, uuid: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0013, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0014, uuid: 00002a19-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb *
handle: 0x0015, uuid: 00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0016, uuid: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0017, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0018, uuid: 00002a29-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0019, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x001a, uuid: 00002a24-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x001b, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x001c, uuid: 00002a27-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x001d, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x001e, uuid: 00002a26-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x001f, uuid: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0020, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0021, uuid: 00001532-1212-efde-1523-785feabcd123
handle: 0x0022, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0023, uuid: 00001531-1212-efde-1523-785feabcd123
handle: 0x0024, uuid: 00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0025, uuid: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
handle: 0x0026, uuid: 00001534-1212-efde-1523-785feabcd123
* Some kind of knowledge about what it does, explained below00002a19-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb [READ]0000fff2-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb [WRITE NO-RESP]The packet value seems to consist of following (This is the first packet being exchanged going from PHONE to LOCK):
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| HEADER | DATA | DATA PACKET 2 | DP 3 | TAIL |
|7f5a0503020001000155aa20|7c247a4d52ac7ee8 90a9158c42380dca524ffafd927212d375681e97 3dcf670a|59 0d0a|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bytes (in DEC):
00 = "Header[0]"
01 = "Header[1]"
02 = "Protocol Type"
03 = "Sub Version" - lockVersion.getProtocolVersion()
04 = "Scene"
05 = "Organization[0]" - lockVersion.getGroupId()
06 = "Organization[1]" - |
07 = "Sub organization[0]" - lockVersion.getOrgId()
08 = "Sub organization[1]" - |
09 = "Command" (ID?)
10 = "Encrypt" (Byte?)
11 = "Length" (Of whole data)
12 = Actual Data
PACKET TAIL
"59 0d 0a" = "59" is the CRC byte of whole header+data
(in this case begins from 7f and ends at 670a) in CRC8/MAXIM format
and "0d 0a" occurrs at the end of every packet,
which is a carriage return + line feed0000fff4-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb [NOTIFY]Listening on this handle (0x000f) and unlocking the door with the fingerprint yields following result:
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ gatttool -b EE:C6:A2:04:9A:F6 --char-write-req --handle=0x000f --value=0100 --listen
Characteristic value was written successfully
Notification handle = 0x000e value: 7f 5a 05 03 02 00 01 00 01 54 00 10 20 d2 fe 7a 7c 82 87 da
Notification handle = 0x000e value: a0 31 80 fa 24 09 1a 3e 19 0d 0a
^C
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ gatttool -b EE:C6:A2:04:9A:F6 --char-write-req --handle=0x000f --value=0100 --listen
Characteristic value was written successfully
Notification handle = 0x000e value: 7f 5a 05 03 02 00 01 00 01 54 00 10 5f 69 3f b8 38 6f 78 1d
Notification handle = 0x000e value: cc 65 c3 b5 16 00 73 75 fe 0d 0a
^C
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ gatttool -b EE:C6:A2:04:9A:F6 --char-write-req --handle=0x000f --value=0100 --listen
Characteristic value was written successfully
Notification handle = 0x000e value: 7f 5a 05 03 02 00 01 00 01 54 00 10 bd 44 1c 43 fe 20 18 83
Notification handle = 0x000e value: 27 a4 f3 ce 30 cf 09 08 c9 0d 0aNotice how the hex 7f 5a 05 03 02 00 01 00 01 54 00 10 is static between all 3 attempts at unlocking the door (that's the header btw). In the second packet, only the final hex 0d 0a is static. It is probably one packet split in two.
Considering that the data is always 16 or 32 bytes long (only data, without the header or tail), we can assure (after some digging) that it's "AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding" encrypted with a padding of 16 (IV 16). However, trying to decrypt it results in bad padding, which means that it isn't "only" AES encrypted. There is also a XOR function involved, which encodes the bytes with the 10th byte (encrypt byte) afaik. More details here: https://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/25760/getting-the-algorithm-used-inside-this-so-file.
In a nutshell:
dscrc_table = [0x00, 0x5E, 0xBC, 0xE2, 0x61, 0x3F, 0xDD, 0x83, 0xC2, 0x9C, 0x7E, 0x20,
0xA3, 0xFD, 0x1F, 0x41, 0x9D, 0xC3, 0x21, 0x7F, 0xFC, 0xA2, 0x40, 0x1E,
0x5F, 0x01, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x3E, 0x60, 0x82, 0xDC, 0x23, 0x07, 0x9F, 0xC1,
0x42, 0x1C, 0xFE, 0xA0, 0xE1, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0x03, 0x80, 0xDE, 0x3C, 0x62,
0xBE, 0xE0, 0x02, 0x5C, 0xDF, 0x81, 0x63, 0x3D, 0x7C, 0x22, 0xC0, 0x9E,
0x1D, 0x43, 0xA1, 0xFF, 0x46, 0x18, 0xFA, 0xA4, 0x27, 0x79, 0x9B, 0xC5,
0x84, 0xDA, 0x38, 0x66, 0xE5, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x07, 0xDB, 0x85, 0x67, 0x39,
0xBA, 0xE4, 0x06, 0x58, 0x19, 0x47, 0xA5, 0xFB, 0x78, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x9A,
0x65, 0x3B, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x04, 0x5A, 0xB8, 0xE6, 0xA7, 0xF9, 0x1B, 0x45,
0xC6, 0x98, 0x7A, 0x24, 0xF8, 0xA6, 0x44, 0x1A, 0x99, 0xC7, 0x25, 0x7B,
0x3A, 0x64, 0x86, 0xD8, 0x5B, 0x05, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0x8C, 0xD2, 0x30, 0x6E,
0xED, 0xB3, 0x51, 0x0F, 0x4E, 0x10, 0xF2, 0xAC, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x93, 0xCD,
0x11, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xF3, 0x70, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x92, 0xD3, 0x8D, 0x6F, 0x31,
0xB2, 0xEC, 0x0E, 0x50, 0xAF, 0xF1, 0x13, 0x4D, 0xCE, 0x90, 0x72, 0x2C,
0x6D, 0x33, 0xD1, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0x52, 0xB0, 0xEE, 0x32, 0x6C, 0x8E, 0xD0,
0x53, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0xB1, 0xF0, 0xAE, 0x4C, 0x12, 0x91, 0xCF, 0x2D, 0x73,
0xCA, 0x94, 0x76, 0x28, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x17, 0x49, 0x08, 0x56, 0xB4, 0xEA,
0x69, 0x37, 0xD5, 0x8B, 0x57, 0x09, 0xEB, 0xB5, 0x36, 0x68, 0x8A, 0xD4,
0x95, 0xCB, 0x29, 0x77, 0xF4, 0xAA, 0x48, 0x16, 0xE9, 0xB7, 0x55, 0x0B,
0x88, 0xD6, 0x34, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0x75, 0x97, 0xC9, 0x4A, 0x14, 0xF6, 0xA8,
0x74, 0x2A, 0xC8, 0x96, 0x15, 0x4B, 0xA9, 0xF7, 0xB6, 0xE8, 0x0A, 0x54,
0xD7, 0x89, 0x6B, 0x35]
def decodeWithEncrypt(data_bytes, encrypt_byte):
da_len = len(data_bytes)
for i in range(0,da_len):
data_bytes[i] ^= encrypt_byte ^ dscrc_table[da_len]The inverse of a XOR function is also XOR *.
Tip: The IV and the key are the same thing in the code! I don't know why, but AESUtil.java clearly shows so.
Even after trying to XOR and AES decrypt it, it still gets a padding error. Something is obviously missing.
This code has a slight chance to be wrong. Someone at StackExchange helped out with the .so Assembly part, however something still doesn't match up. The .so contains two functions which are used a lot throughout the code: encodeWithEncrypt and decodeWithEncrypt. Above code does the XOR part, and we know that the inverse of XOR is XOR, so why does the file have two functions, one to encode and one to decode?
The SDK in question is this one and to get the source code from it, simply unpack it and run classes.jar through Procyon or CFR (Online tool here). The .so file, which basically just contains a basic CRC8/MAXIM encode/decode algorithm, you can find inside the SDK by unpacking it and looking into jni/<platform>.
Feel free to PR to this Readme or even actual code! The only thing that I ask you is not to push proprietary code, other than that, feel free :)
With the hard work of @kind3r it has now become true! The TTLock has been mostly reverse-engineered and is working with a RPi: https://github.com/kind3r/ttlock-sdk-js/