An evolving how-to guide for securing a Linux server that, hopefully, also teaches you a little about security and why it matters.
(TOC made with nGitHubTOC)
This guides purpose is to teach you how to secure a Linux server.
There are a lot of things you can do to secure a Linux server and this guide will attempt to cover as many of them as possible. More topics/material will be added as I learn, or as folks contribute.
Ansible playbooks of this guide are available at How To Secure A Linux Server With Ansible by moltenbit.
I assume you're using this guide because you, hopefully, already understand why good security is important. That is a heavy topic onto itself and breaking it down is out-of-scope for this guide. If you don't know the answer to that question, I advise you research it first.
At a high level, the second a device, like a server, is in the public domain -- i.e. visible to the outside world -- it becomes a target for bad-actors. An unsecured device is a playground for bad-actors who want access to your data, or to use your server as another node for their large-scale DDOS attacks.
What's worse is, without good security, you may never know if your server has been compromised. A bad-actor may have gained unauthorized access to your server and copied your data without changing anything, so you'd never know. Or your server may have been part of a DDOS attack, and you wouldn't know. Look at many of the large scale data breaches in the news -- the companies often did not discover the data leak or intrusion until long after the bad-actors were gone.
Contrary to popular belief, bad-actors don't always want to change something or lock you out of your data for money. Sometimes they just want the data on your server for their data warehouses (there is big money in big data) or to covertly use your server for their nefarious purposes.
This guide may appear duplicative/unnecessary because there are countless articles online that tell you how to secure Linux, but the information is spread across different articles, that cover different things, and in different ways. Who has time to scour through hundreds of articles?
As I was going through research for my Debian build, I kept notes. At the end I realized that, along with what I already knew, and what I was learning, I had the makings of a how-to guide. I figured I'd put it online to hopefully help others learn, and save time.
I've never found one guide that covers everything -- this guide is my attempt.
Many of the things covered in this guide may be rather basic/trivial, but most of us do not install Linux every day, and it is easy to forget those basic things.
There are many guides provided by experts, industry leaders, and the distributions themselves. It is not practical, and sometimes against copyright, to include everything from those guides. I recommend you check them out before starting with this guide.
This guide...
There are many types of servers and different use-cases. While I want this guide to be as generic as possible, there will be some things that may not apply to all/other use-cases. Use your best judgement when going through this guide.
To help put context to many of the topics covered in this guide, my use-case/configuration is:
I am very lazy and do not like to edit files by hand if I don't need to. I also assume everyone else is just like me. :)
So, when and where possible, I have provided code
snippets to quickly do what is needed, like add or change a line in a configuration file.
The code
snippets use basic commands like echo
, cat
, sed
, awk
, and grep
. How the code
snippets work, like what each command/part does, is out of scope for this guide -- the man
pages are your friend.
Note: The code
snippets do not validate/verify the change went through -- i.e. the line was actually added or changed. I'll leave the verifying part in your capable hands. The steps in this guide do include taking backups of all files that will be changed.
Not all changes can be automated with code
snippets. Those changes need good, old-fashioned, manual editing. For example, you can't just append a line to an INI type file. Use your favorite Linux text editor.
I wanted to put this guide on GitHub to make it easy to collaborate. The more folks that contribute, the better and more complete this guide will become.
To contribute you can fork and submit a pull request or submit a new issue.
Before you start you will want to identify what your Principles are. What is your threat model? Some things to think about:
These are just a few things to think about. Before you start securing your server you will want to understand what you're trying to protect against and why so you know what you need to do.
This guide is intended to be distribution agnostic so users can use any distribution they want. With that said, there are a few things to keep in mind:
You want a distribution that...
Installing Linux is out-of-scope for this guide because each distribution does it differently and the installation instructions are usually well documented. If you need help, start with your distribution's documentation. Regardless of the distribution, the high-level process usually goes like so:
Where applicable, use the expert install option so you have tighter control of what is running on your server. Only install what you absolutely need. I, personally, do not install anything other than SSH. Also, tick the Disk Encryption option.
sudo apt update && sudo apt upgrade
on Debian based systems)./etc/fstab
man
apt
commands that should work on all Debian based distributions. If someone is willing to provide the respective commands for other distributions, I will add them.Ansible playbooks of this guide are available at How To Secure A Linux Server With Ansible.
Make sure to edit the variables according to your needs and read all tasks beforehand to confirm it does not break your system. After running the playbooks ensure that all settings are configured to your needs!
Install Ansible
Create SSH-Public/Private-Keys
ssh-keygen -t ed25519
Change all variables in group_vars/variables.yml according to your needs.
Enable SSH root access before running the playbooks:
nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config
[...]
PermitRootLogin yes
[...]
Recommended: configure static IP address on your system.
Add your systems IP address to hosts.yml.
Run the requirements playbook using the root password you specified while installing the server:
ansible-playbook --inventory hosts.yml --ask-pass requirements-playbook.yml
Run the main playbook with the new users password you specified in the variables.yml file:
ansible-playbook --inventory hosts.yml --ask-pass main-playbook.yml
If you need to run the playbooks multiple times remember to use the SSH key and the new SSH port:
ansible-playbook --inventory hosts.yml -e ansible_ssh_port=SSH_PORT --key-file /PATH/TO/SSH/KEY main-playbook.yml
It is highly advised you keep a 2nd terminal open to your server before you make and apply SSH configuration changes. This way if you lock yourself out of your 1st terminal session, you still have one session connected so you can fix it.
Thank you to Sonnenbrand for this idea.
Using SSH public/private keys is more secure than using a password. It also makes it easier and faster, to connect to our server because you don't have to enter a password.
Check the references below for more details but, at a high level, public/private keys work by using a pair of keys to verify identity.
For SSH, a public and private key is created on the client. You want to keep both keys secure, especially the private key. Even though the public key is meant to be public, it is wise to make sure neither keys fall in the wrong hands.
When you connect to an SSH server, SSH will look for a public key that matches the client you're connecting from in the file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
on the server you're connecting to. Notice the file is in the home folder of the ID you're trying to connect to. So, after creating the public key, you need to append it to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
. One approach is to copy it to a USB stick and physically transfer it to the server. Another approach is to use ssh-copy-id
to transfer and append the public key.
After the keys have been created and the public key has been appended to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
on the host, SSH uses the public and private keys to verify identity and then establish a secure connection. How identity is verified is a complicated process but Digital Ocean has a very nice write-up of how it works. At a high level, identity is verified by the server encrypting a challenge message with the public key, then sending it to the client. If the client cannot decrypt the challenge message with the private key, the identity can't be verified and a connection will not be established.
They are considered more secure because you need the private key to establish an SSH connection. If you set PasswordAuthentication no
in /etc/ssh/sshd_config
, then SSH won't let you connect without the private key.
You can also set a pass-phrase for the keys which would require you to enter the key pass-phrase when connecting using public/private keys. Keep in mind doing this means you can't use the key for automation because you'll have no way to send the passphrase in your scripts. ssh-agent
is a program that is shipped in many Linux distros (and usually already running) that will allow you to hold your unencrypted private key in memory for a configurable duration. Simply run ssh-add
and it will prompt you for your passphrase. You will not be prompted for your passphrase again until the configurable duration has passed.
We will be using Ed25519 keys which, according to https://linux-audit.com/:
It is using an elliptic curve signature scheme, which offers better security than ECDSA and DSA. At the same time, it also has good performance.
man ssh-keygen
man ssh-copy-id
man ssh-add
From the computer you're going to use to connect to your server, the client, not the server itself, create an Ed25519 key with ssh-keygen
:
ssh-keygen -t ed25519
Generating public/private ed25519 key pair. Enter file in which to save the key (/home/user/.ssh/id_ed25519): Created directory '/home/user/.ssh'. Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase): Enter same passphrase again: Your identification has been saved in /home/user/.ssh/id_ed25519. Your public key has been saved in /home/user/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub. The key fingerprint is: SHA256:F44D4dr2zoHqgj0i2iVIHQ32uk/Lx4P+raayEAQjlcs user@client The key's randomart image is: +--[ED25519 256]--+ |xxxx x | |o.o +. . | | o o oo . | |. E oo . o . | | o o. o S o | |... .. o o | |.+....+ o | |+.=++o.B.. | |+..=**=o=. | +----[SHA256]-----+
Note: If you set a passphrase, you'll need to enter it every time you connect to your server using this key, unless you're using ssh-agent
.
Now you need to append the public key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
from your client to the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
file on your server. Since we're presumable still at home on the LAN, we're probably safe from MIM attacks, so we will use ssh-copy-id
to transfer and append the public key:
ssh-copy-id user@server
/usr/bin/ssh-copy-id: INFO: Source of key(s) to be installed: "/home/user/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub" The authenticity of host 'host (192.168.1.96)' can't be established. ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:QaDQb/X0XyVlogh87sDXE7MR8YIK7ko4wS5hXjRySJE. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes /usr/bin/ssh-copy-id: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed /usr/bin/ssh-copy-id: INFO: 1 key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys user@host's password: Number of key(s) added: 1 Now try logging into the machine, with: "ssh 'user@host'" and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added.
Now would be a good time to perform any tasks specific to your setup.
To make it easy to control who can SSH to the server. By using a group, we can quickly add/remove accounts to the group to quickly allow or not allow SSH access to the server.
We will use the AllowGroups option in SSH's configuration file /etc/ssh/sshd_config
to tell the SSH server to only allow users to SSH in if they are a member of a certain UNIX group. Anyone not in the group will not be able to SSH in.
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
to limit who can SSH to the serverAllowGroup
setting set in Secure /etc/ssh/sshd_config
.man groupadd
man usermod
Create a group:
sudo groupadd sshusers
Add account(s) to the group:
sudo usermod -a -G sshusers user1
sudo usermod -a -G sshusers user2
sudo usermod -a -G sshusers ...
You'll need to do this for every account on your server that needs SSH access.
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
SSH is a door into your server. This is especially true if you are opening ports on your router so you can SSH to your server from outside your home network. If it is not secured properly, a bad-actor could use it to gain unauthorized access to your system.
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
is the default configuration file that the SSH server uses. We will use this file to tell what options the SSH server should use.
man sshd_config
Make a backup of OpenSSH server's configuration file /etc/ssh/sshd_config
and remove comments to make it easier to read:
sudo cp --archive /etc/ssh/sshd_config /etc/ssh/sshd_config-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
sudo sed -i -r -e '/^#|^$/ d' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config
then find and edit or add these settings that should be applied regardless of your configuration/setup:
Note: SSH does not like duplicate contradicting settings. For example, if you have ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
and then ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
, SSH will respect the first one and ignore the second. Your /etc/ssh/sshd_config
file may already have some of the settings/lines below. To avoid issues you will need to manually go through your /etc/ssh/sshd_config
file and address any duplicate contradicting settings.
########################################################################################################
# start settings from https://infosec.mozilla.org/guidelines/openssh#modern-openssh-67 as of 2019-01-01
########################################################################################################
# Supported HostKey algorithms by order of preference.
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,umac-128@openssh.com
# LogLevel VERBOSE logs user's key fingerprint on login. Needed to have a clear audit track of which key was using to log in.
LogLevel VERBOSE
# Use kernel sandbox mechanisms where possible in unprivileged processes
# Systrace on OpenBSD, Seccomp on Linux, seatbelt on MacOSX/Darwin, rlimit elsewhere.
# Note: This setting is deprecated in OpenSSH 7.5 (https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.5)
# UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox
########################################################################################################
# end settings from https://infosec.mozilla.org/guidelines/openssh#modern-openssh-67 as of 2019-01-01
########################################################################################################
# don't let users set environment variables
PermitUserEnvironment no
# Log sftp level file access (read/write/etc.) that would not be easily logged otherwise.
Subsystem sftp internal-sftp -f AUTHPRIV -l INFO
# only use the newer, more secure protocol
Protocol 2
# disable X11 forwarding as X11 is very insecure
# you really shouldn't be running X on a server anyway
X11Forwarding no
# disable port forwarding
AllowTcpForwarding no
AllowStreamLocalForwarding no
GatewayPorts no
PermitTunnel no
# don't allow login if the account has an empty password
PermitEmptyPasswords no
# ignore .rhosts and .shosts
IgnoreRhosts yes
# verify hostname matches IP
UseDNS yes
Compression no
TCPKeepAlive no
AllowAgentForwarding no
PermitRootLogin no
# don't allow .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
HostbasedAuthentication no
# https://github.com/imthenachoman/How-To-Secure-A-Linux-Server/issues/115
HashKnownHosts yes
Then find and edit or add these settings, and set values as per your requirements:
Setting | Valid Values | Example | Description | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|
AllowGroups | local UNIX group name | AllowGroups sshusers |
group to allow SSH access to | |
ClientAliveCountMax | number | ClientAliveCountMax 0 |
maximum number of client alive messages sent without response | |
ClientAliveInterval | number of seconds | ClientAliveInterval 300 |
timeout in seconds before a response request | |
ListenAddress | space separated list of local addresses |
|
local addresses sshd should listen on |
See Issue #1 for important details. |
LoginGraceTime | number of seconds | LoginGraceTime 30 |
time in seconds before login times-out | |
MaxAuthTries | number | MaxAuthTries 2 |
maximum allowed attempts to login | |
MaxSessions | number | MaxSessions 2 |
maximum number of open sessions | |
MaxStartups | number | MaxStartups 2 |
maximum number of login sessions | |
PasswordAuthentication | yes or no |
PasswordAuthentication no |
if login with a password is allowed | |
Port | any open/available port number | Port 22 |
port that sshd should listen on |
Check man sshd_config
for more details what these settings mean.
Make sure there are no duplicate settings that contradict each other. The below command should not have any output.
awk 'NF && $1!~/^(#|HostKey)/{print $1}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sort | uniq -c | grep -v ' 1 '
Restart ssh:
sudo service sshd restart
You can check verify the configurations worked with sshd -T
and verify the output:
sudo sshd -T
port 22 addressfamily any listenaddress [::]:22 listenaddress 0.0.0.0:22 usepam yes logingracetime 30 x11displayoffset 10 maxauthtries 2 maxsessions 2 clientaliveinterval 300 clientalivecountmax 0 streamlocalbindmask 0177 permitrootlogin no ignorerhosts yes ignoreuserknownhosts no hostbasedauthentication no ... subsystem sftp internal-sftp -f AUTHPRIV -l INFO maxstartups 2:30:2 permittunnel no ipqos lowdelay throughput rekeylimit 0 0 permitopen any
Per Mozilla's OpenSSH guidelines for OpenSSH 6.7+, "all Diffie-Hellman moduli in use should be at least 3072-bit-long".
The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is used by SSH to establish a secure connection. The larger the moduli (key size) the stronger the encryption.
man moduli
Make a backup of SSH's moduli file /etc/ssh/moduli
:
sudo cp --archive /etc/ssh/moduli /etc/ssh/moduli-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
Remove short moduli:
sudo awk '$5 >= 3071' /etc/ssh/moduli | sudo tee /etc/ssh/moduli.tmp
sudo mv /etc/ssh/moduli.tmp /etc/ssh/moduli
Even though SSH is a pretty good security guard for your doors and windows, it is still a visible door that bad-actors can see and try to brute-force in. Fail2ban will monitor for these brute-force attempts but there is no such thing as being too secure. Requiring two factors adds an extra layer of security.
Using Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) / Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) requires anyone entering to have two keys to enter which makes it harder for bad actors. The two keys are:
Without both keys, they won't be able to get in.
Many folks might find the experience cumbersome or annoying. And, access to your system is dependent on the accompanying authenticator app that generates the code.
On Linux, PAM is responsible for authentication. There are four tasks to PAM that you can read about at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_PAM. This section talks about the authentication task.
When you log into a server, be it directly from the console or via SSH, the door you came through will send the request to the authentication task of PAM and PAM will ask for and verify your password. You can customize the rules each doors use. For example, you could have one set of rules when logging in directly from the console and another set of rules for when logging in via SSH.
This section will alter the authentication rules for when logging in via SSH to require both a password and a 6 digit code.
We will use Google's libpam-google-authenticator PAM module to create and verify a TOTP key. https://fastmail.blog/2016/07/22/how-totp-authenticator-apps-work/ and https://jemurai.com/2018/10/11/how-it-works-totp-based-mfa/ have very good writeups of how TOTP works.
What we will do is tell the server's SSH PAM configuration to ask the user for their password and then their numeric token. PAM will then verify the user's password and, if it is correct, then it will route the authentication request to libpam-google-authenticator which will ask for and verify your 6 digit token. If, and only if, everything is good will the authentication succeed and user be allowed to log in.
Install it libpam-google-authenticator.
On Debian based systems:
sudo apt install libpam-google-authenticator
Make sure you're logged in as the ID you want to enable 2FA/MFA for and execute google-authenticator
to create the necessary token data:
google-authenticator
Do you want authentication tokens to be time-based (y/n) y https://www.google.com/chart?chs=200x200&chld=M|0&cht=qr&chl=otpauth://totp/user@host%3Fsecret%3DR4ZWX34FQKZROVX7AGLJ64684Y%26issuer%3Dhost ... Your new secret key is: R3NVX3FFQKZROVX7AGLJUGGESY Your verification code is 751419 Your emergency scratch codes are: 12345678 90123456 78901234 56789012 34567890 Do you want me to update your "/home/user/.google_authenticator" file (y/n) y Do you want to disallow multiple uses of the same authentication token? This restricts you to one login about every 30s, but it increases your chances to notice or even prevent man-in-the-middle attacks (y/n) Do you want to disallow multiple uses of the same authentication token? This restricts you to one login about every 30s, but it increases your chances to notice or even prevent man-in-the-middle attacks (y/n) y By default, tokens are good for 30 seconds. In order to compensate for possible time-skew between the client and the server, we allow an extra token before and after the current time. If you experience problems with poor time synchronization, you can increase the window from its default size of +-1min (window size of 3) to about +-4min (window size of 17 acceptable tokens). Do you want to do so? (y/n) y If the computer that you are logging into isn't hardened against brute-force login attempts, you can enable rate-limiting for the authentication module. By default, this limits attackers to no more than 3 login attempts every 30s. Do you want to enable rate-limiting (y/n) y
Notice this is not run as root.
Select default option (y in most cases) for all the questions it asks and remember to save the emergency scratch codes.
Make a backup of PAM's SSH configuration file /etc/pam.d/sshd
:
sudo cp --archive /etc/pam.d/sshd /etc/pam.d/sshd-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
Now we need to enable it as an authentication method for SSH by adding this line to /etc/pam.d/sshd
:
auth required pam_google_authenticator.so nullok
Note: Check here for what nullok
means.
echo -e "\nauth required pam_google_authenticator.so nullok # added by $(whoami) on $(date +"%Y-%m-%d @ %H:%M:%S")" | sudo tee -a /etc/pam.d/sshd
Tell SSH to leverage it by adding or editing this line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config
:
ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
sudo sed -i -r -e "s/^(challengeresponseauthentication .*)$/# \1 # commented by $(whoami) on $(date +"%Y-%m-%d @ %H:%M:%S")/I" /etc/ssh/sshd_config
echo -e "\nChallengeResponseAuthentication yes # added by $(whoami) on $(date +"%Y-%m-%d @ %H:%M:%S")" | sudo tee -a /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Restart ssh:
sudo service sshd restart
sudo lets accounts run commands as other accounts, including root. We want to make sure that only the accounts we want can use sudo.
Your installation may have already done this, or may already have a special group intended for this purpose so check first.
Debian creates the sudo group. To view users that are part of this group (thus have sudo privileges):
cat /etc/group | grep "sudo"
sudo
does not require a password. Thanks to sbrl for sharing.Create a group:
sudo groupadd sudousers
Add account(s) to the group:
sudo usermod -a -G sudousers user1
sudo usermod -a -G sudousers user2
sudo usermod -a -G sudousers ...
You'll need to do this for every account on your server that needs sudo privileges.
Make a backup of the sudo's configuration file /etc/sudoers
:
sudo cp --archive /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
Edit sudo's configuration file /etc/sudoers
:
sudo visudo
Tell sudo to only allow users in the sudousers
group to use sudo by adding this line if it is not already there:
%sudousers ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL
su also lets accounts run commands as other accounts, including root. We want to make sure that only the accounts we want can use su.
Create a group:
sudo groupadd suusers
Add account(s) to the group:
sudo usermod -a -G suusers user1
sudo usermod -a -G suusers user2
sudo usermod -a -G suusers ...
You'll need to do this for every account on your server that needs sudo privileges.
Make it so only users in this group can execute /bin/su
:
sudo dpkg-statoverride --update --add root suusers 4750 /bin/su
It's absolutely better, for many applications, to run in a sandbox.
Browsers (even more the Closed Source ones) and eMail Clients are highly suggested.
Install the software:
sudo apt install firejail firejail-profiles
Note: for Debian 10 Stable, official Backport is suggested:
sudo apt install -t buster-backports firejail firejail-profiles
Allow an application (installed in /usr/bin
or /bin
) to run only in a sandbox (see few examples below here):
sudo ln -s /usr/bin/firejail /usr/local/bin/google-chrome-stable
sudo ln -s /usr/bin/firejail /usr/local/bin/firefox
sudo ln -s /usr/bin/firejail /usr/local/bin/chromium
sudo ln -s /usr/bin/firejail /usr/local/bin/evolution
sudo ln -s /usr/bin/firejail /usr/local/bin/thunderbird
Run the application as usual (via terminal or launcher) and check if it's running in a jail:
firejail --list
Allow a sandboxed app to run again as it was before (example: firefox)
sudo rm /usr/local/bin/firefox
Many security protocols leverage the time. If your system time is incorrect, it could have negative impacts to your server. An NTP client can solve that problem by keeping your system time in-sync with global NTP servers
NTP stands for Network Time Protocol. In the context of this guide, an NTP client on the server is used to update the server time with the official time pulled from official servers. Check https://www.pool.ntp.org/en/ for all of the public NTP servers.
Install ntp.
On Debian based systems:
sudo apt install ntp
Make a backup of the NTP client's configuration file /etc/ntp.conf
:
sudo cp --archive /etc/ntpsec/ntp.conf /etc/ntpsec/ntp.conf-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
The default configuration, at least on Debian, is already pretty secure. The only thing we'll want to make sure is we're the pool
directive and not any server
directives. The pool
directive allows the NTP client to stop using a server if it is unresponsive or serving bad time. Do this by commenting out all server
directives and adding the below to /etc/ntp.conf
.
pool pool.ntp.org iburst
sudo sed -i -r -e "s/^((server|pool).*)/# \1 # commented by $(whoami) on $(date +"%Y-%m-%d @ %H:%M:%S")/" /etc/ntp.conf
echo -e "\npool pool.ntp.org iburst # added by $(whoami) on $(date +"%Y-%m-%d @ %H:%M:%S")" | sudo tee -a /etc/ntp.conf
Example /etc/ntp.conf
:
driftfile /var/lib/ntp/ntp.drift statistics loopstats peerstats clockstats filegen loopstats file loopstats type day enable filegen peerstats file peerstats type day enable filegen clockstats file clockstats type day enable restrict -4 default kod notrap nomodify nopeer noquery limited restrict -6 default kod notrap nomodify nopeer noquery limited restrict 127.0.0.1 restrict ::1 restrict source notrap nomodify noquery pool pool.ntp.org iburst # added by user on 2019-03-09 @ 10:23:35
Restart ntp:
sudo service ntp restart
Check the status of the ntp service:
sudo systemctl status ntp
● ntp.service - LSB: Start NTP daemon Loaded: loaded (/etc/init.d/ntp; generated; vendor preset: enabled) Active: active (running) since Sat 2019-03-09 15:19:46 EST; 4s ago Docs: man:systemd-sysv-generator(8) Process: 1016 ExecStop=/etc/init.d/ntp stop (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS) Process: 1028 ExecStart=/etc/init.d/ntp start (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS) Tasks: 2 (limit: 4915) CGroup: /system.slice/ntp.service └─1038 /usr/sbin/ntpd -p /var/run/ntpd.pid -g -u 108:113 Mar 09 15:19:46 host ntpd[1038]: Listen and drop on 0 v6wildcard [::]:123 Mar 09 15:19:46 host ntpd[1038]: Listen and drop on 1 v4wildcard 0.0.0.0:123 Mar 09 15:19:46 host ntpd[1038]: Listen normally on 2 lo 127.0.0.1:123 Mar 09 15:19:46 host ntpd[1038]: Listen normally on 3 enp0s3 10.10.20.96:123 Mar 09 15:19:46 host ntpd[1038]: Listen normally on 4 lo [::1]:123 Mar 09 15:19:46 host ntpd[1038]: Listen normally on 5 enp0s3 [fe80::a00:27ff:feb6:ed8e%2]:123 Mar 09 15:19:46 host ntpd[1038]: Listening on routing socket on fd #22 for interface updates Mar 09 15:19:47 host ntpd[1038]: Soliciting pool server 108.61.56.35 Mar 09 15:19:48 host ntpd[1038]: Soliciting pool server 69.89.207.199 Mar 09 15:19:49 host ntpd[1038]: Soliciting pool server 45.79.111.114
Check ntp's status:
sudo ntpq -p
remote refid st t when poll reach delay offset jitter ============================================================================== pool.ntp.org .POOL. 16 p - 64 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 *lithium.constan 198.30.92.2 2 u - 64 1 19.900 4.894 3.951 ntp2.wiktel.com 212.215.1.157 2 u 2 64 1 48.061 -0.431 0.104
To quote https://linux-audit.com/linux-system-hardening-adding-hidepid-to-proc/:
When looking in
/proc
you will discover a lot of files and directories. Many of them are just numbers, which represent the information about a particular process ID (PID). By default, Linux systems are deployed to allow all local users to see this all information. This includes process information from other users. This could include sensitive details that you may not want to share with other users. By applying some filesystem configuration tweaks, we can change this behavior and improve the security of the system.
Note: This may break on some systemd
systems. Please see https://github.com/imthenachoman/How-To-Secure-A-Linux-Server/issues/37 for more information. Thanks to nlgranger for sharing.
/proc
mounted with hidepid=2
so users can only see information about their processesMake a backup of /etc/fstab
:
sudo cp --archive /etc/fstab /etc/fstab-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
Add this line to /etc/fstab
to have /proc
mounted with hidepid=2
:
proc /proc proc defaults,hidepid=2 0 0
echo -e "\nproc /proc proc defaults,hidepid=2 0 0 # added by $(whoami) on $(date +"%Y-%m-%d @ %H:%M:%S")" | sudo tee -a /etc/fstab
Reboot the system:
sudo reboot now
Note: Alternatively, you can remount /proc
without rebooting with sudo mount -o remount,hidepid=2 /proc
By default, accounts can use any password they want, including bad ones. pwquality/pam_pwquality addresses this security gap by providing "a way to configure the default password quality requirements for the system passwords" and checking "its strength against a system dictionary and a set of rules for identifying poor choices."
On Linux, PAM is responsible for authentication. There are four tasks to PAM that you can read about at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_PAM. This section talks about the password task.
When there is a need to set or change an account password, the password task of PAM handles the request. In this section we will tell PAM's password task to pass the requested new password to libpam-pwquality to make sure it meets our requirements. If the requirements are met it is used/set; if it does not meet the requirements it errors and lets the user know.
Install libpam-pwquality.
On Debian based systems:
sudo apt install libpam-pwquality
Make a backup of PAM's password configuration file /etc/pam.d/common-password
:
sudo cp --archive /etc/pam.d/common-password /etc/pam.d/common-password-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
Tell PAM to use libpam-pwquality to enforce strong passwords by editing the file /etc/pam.d/common-password
and change the line that starts like this:
password requisite pam_pwquality.so
to this:
password requisite pam_pwquality.so retry=3 minlen=10 difok=3 ucredit=-1 lcredit=-1 dcredit=-1 ocredit=-1 maxrepeat=3 gecoschec
The above options are:
retry=3
= prompt user 3 times before returning with error.minlen=10
= the minimum length of the password, factoring in any credits (or debits) from these:
dcredit=-1
= must have at least one digitucredit=-1
= must have at least one upper case letterlcredit=-1
= must have at least one lower case letterocredit=-1
= must have at least one non-alphanumeric characterdifok=3
= at least 3 characters from the new password cannot have been in the old passwordmaxrepeat=3
= allow a maximum of 3 repeated charactersgecoschec
= do not allow passwords with the account's namesudo sed -i -r -e "s/^(password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwquality.so)(.*)$/# \1\2 # commented by $(whoami) on $(date +"%Y-%m-%d @ %H:%M:%S")\n\1 retry=3 minlen=10 difok=3 ucredit=-1 lcredit=-1 dcredit=-1 ocredit=-1 maxrepeat=3 gecoschec # added by $(whoami) on $(date +"%Y-%m-%d @ %H:%M:%S")/" /etc/pam.d/common-password
It is important to keep a server updated with the latest critical security patches and updates. Otherwise you're at risk of known security vulnerabilities that bad-actors could use to gain unauthorized access to your server.
Unless you plan on checking your server every day, you'll want a way to automatically update the system and/or get emails about available updates.
You don't want to do all updates because with every update there is a risk of something breaking. It is important to do the critical updates but everything else can wait until you have time to do it manually.
Automatic and unattended updates may break your system and you may not be near your server to fix it. This would be especially problematic if it broke your SSH access.
On Debian based systems you can use:
We will use unattended-upgrades to apply critical security patches. We can also apply stable updates since they've already been thoroughly tested by the Debian community.
/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/50unattended-upgrades
Install unattended-upgrades, apt-listchanges, and apticron:
sudo apt install unattended-upgrades apt-listchanges apticron
Now we need to configure unattended-upgrades to automatically apply the updates. This is typically done by editing the files /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades
and /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/50unattended-upgrades
that were created by the packages. However, because these file may get overwritten with a future update, we'll create a new file instead. Create the file /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/51myunattended-upgrades
and add this:
// Enable the update/upgrade script (0=disable)
APT::Periodic::Enable "1";
// Do "apt-get update" automatically every n-days (0=disable)
APT::Periodic::Update-Package-Lists "1";
// Do "apt-get upgrade --download-only" every n-days (0=disable)
APT::Periodic::Download-Upgradeable-Packages "1";
// Do "apt-get autoclean" every n-days (0=disable)
APT::Periodic::AutocleanInterval "7";
// Send report mail to root
// 0: no report (or null string)
// 1: progress report (actually any string)
// 2: + command outputs (remove -qq, remove 2>/dev/null, add -d)
// 3: + trace on APT::Periodic::Verbose "2";
APT::Periodic::Unattended-Upgrade "1";
// Automatically upgrade packages from these
Unattended-Upgrade::Origins-Pattern {
"o=Debian,a=stable";
"o=Debian,a=stable-updates";
"origin=Debian,codename=${distro_codename},label=Debian-Security";
};
// You can specify your own packages to NOT automatically upgrade here
Unattended-Upgrade::Package-Blacklist {
};
// Run dpkg --force-confold --configure -a if a unclean dpkg state is detected to true to ensure that updates get installed even when the system got interrupted during a previous run
Unattended-Upgrade::AutoFixInterruptedDpkg "true";
//Perform the upgrade when the machine is running because we wont be shutting our server down often
Unattended-Upgrade::InstallOnShutdown "false";
// Send an email to this address with information about the packages upgraded.
Unattended-Upgrade::Mail "root";
// Always send an e-mail
Unattended-Upgrade::MailOnlyOnError "false";
// Remove all unused dependencies after the upgrade has finished
Unattended-Upgrade::Remove-Unused-Dependencies "true";
// Remove any new unused dependencies after the upgrade has finished
Unattended-Upgrade::Remove-New-Unused-Dependencies "true";
// Automatically reboot WITHOUT CONFIRMATION if the file /var/run/reboot-required is found after the upgrade.
Unattended-Upgrade::Automatic-Reboot "true";
// Automatically reboot even if users are logged in.
Unattended-Upgrade::Automatic-Reboot-WithUsers "true";
Notes:
/usr/lib/apt/apt.systemd.daily
for details on the APT::Periodic
optionsUnattended-Upgrade
optionsRun a dry-run of unattended-upgrades to make sure your configuration file is okay:
sudo unattended-upgrade -d --dry-run
If everything is okay, you can let it run whenever it's scheduled to or force a run with unattended-upgrade -d
.
Configure apt-listchanges to your liking:
sudo dpkg-reconfigure apt-listchanges
For apticron, the default settings are good enough but you can check them in /etc/apticron/apticron.conf
if you want to change them. For example, my configuration looks like this:
EMAIL="root" NOTIFY_NO_UPDATES="1"
WIP
WIP
WIP
Install rng-tools.
On Debian based systems:
sudo apt-get install rng-tools
Now we need to set the hardware device used to generate random numbers by adding this to /etc/default/rng-tools
:
HRNGDEVICE=/dev/urandom
echo "HRNGDEVICE=/dev/urandom" | sudo tee -a /etc/default/rng-tools
Restart the service:
sudo systemctl stop rng-tools.service
sudo systemctl start rng-tools.service
Test randomness:
A nice tool to add extra password security, against physical attack (In-Person) Ramson/Rob/assault methods.
The pamduress will add to the X user a secondary password (Panic password), when this password match will start run a script (this script do what you what the user do, when he logins with THESE panic password.
Practical & real Example: "Some Robber invade a home, and steal the server (containing IMPORTANT business backups, and ownlife memories and blablabla). Not exist any disk/boot encryption. Robber have start the server on their 'safe zone' and start an bruteforce attack. He have cracked the local password by SSH with from sudoer user 'admin' success, yeah a dummy password, not THE Strong one/primary. He starts SSH session/or physical session with that cracked dummy/panic password with 'admin' sudoer. He starts feeling the server seems too much busy in less than 2 minutes until to freeze.. 'wtf!?! lets reboot and continue steal info..'.. sorry friend. all data and system was destroyed.". Conclusion, the robber cracked the dummy/panic/secondary password, and with this password its associated a script will do delete all files, config, system, boot and after than start charge the RAM and CPU to force robber reboot system.
Prevent access to malicious person to access server information when get an a password in force way (assault, gun, ransom, ...). Of course this is helpfull in other situations.
Run this (hellresistor Lazy-Tool-Script).
#!/bin/bash
myownscript(){
#######################################################
## ***** EDIT THIS SCRIPT TO YOUR PROPOSES *****#
cat > "$ScriptFile" <<-EOF
sudo rm -rf /home
EOF ####################################################### } echo "Lets Config a PANIC PASSWORD ;)" && sleep 1 read -r -p "Want you REALLY configure A PANIC PASSWORD?? Write [ OK ] : " PAMDUR if [[ "$PAMDUR" = "OK" ]]; then echo "Lets Config a PANIC USER, PASSWORD and SCRIPT ;)" && sleep 1 while [ -z "$PANICUSR" ] do read -r -p "WRITE a Panic User to your pam-duress user [ root ]: " PANICUSR PANICUSR=${PANICUSR:=root} done if [ -z "$ScriptLoc" ]; then read -r -p "SET Script Directory with FULL PATH [ /root/.duress ]: " ScriptLoc ScriptLoc=${ScriptLoc:=/root/.duress} ScriptFile="$ScriptLoc/PanicScript.sh" fi else echo "NOT Use PAM DURESS aKa Panic Password!!! Bye" exit 1 fi
sudo apt install -y git build-essential libpam0g-dev libssl-dev
cd "$HOME" || exit 1 git clone https://github.com/nuvious/pam-duress.git cd pam-duress || exit 1 make sudo make install make clean
mkdir -p $ScriptLoc sudo mkdir -p /etc/duress.d myownscript duress_sign $ScriptFile chmod -R 500 $ScriptLoc chmod 400 $ScriptLoc/*.sha256 chown -R $PANICUSR $ScriptLoc
sudo cp --preserve /etc/pam.d/common-auth /etc/pam.d/common-auth.bck
echo " auth [success=2 default=ignore] pam_unix.so nullok_secure auth [success=1 default=ignore] pam_duress.so auth requisite pam_deny.so auth required pam_permit.so " | sudo tee /etc/pam.d/common-auth
read -r -p "Press
([Table of Contents](#table-of-contents))
## The Network
### Firewall With UFW (Uncomplicated Firewall)
#### Why
Call me paranoid, and you don't have to agree, but I want to deny all traffic in and out of my server except what I explicitly allow. Why would my server be sending traffic out that I don't know about? And why would external traffic be trying to access my server if I don't know who or what it is? When it comes to good security, my opinion is to reject/deny by default, and allow by exception.
Of course, if you disagree, that is totally fine and can configure UFW to suit your needs.
Either way, ensuring that only traffic we explicitly allow is the job of a firewall.
#### How It Works
The Linux kernel provides capabilities to monitor and control network traffic. These capabilities are exposed to the end-user through firewall utilities. On Linux, the most common firewall is [iptables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iptables). However, iptables is rather complicated and confusing (IMHO). This is where UFW comes in. Think of UFW as a front-end to iptables. It simplifies the process of managing the iptables rules that tell the Linux kernel what to do with network traffic.
**UFW** works by letting you configure rules that:
- **allow** or **deny**
- **input** or **output** traffic
- **to** or **from** ports
You can create rules by explicitly specifying the ports or with application configurations that specify the ports.
#### Goals
- all network traffic, input and output, blocked except those we explicitly allow
#### Notes
- As you install other programs, you'll need to enable the necessary ports/applications.
#### References
- https://launchpad.net/ufw
#### Steps
1. Install ufw.
On Debian based systems:
``` bash
sudo apt install ufw
Deny all outgoing traffic:
sudo ufw default deny outgoing comment 'deny all outgoing traffic'
Default outgoing policy changed to 'deny' (be sure to update your rules accordingly)
If you are not as paranoid as me, and don't want to deny all outgoing traffic, you can allow it instead:
sudo ufw default allow outgoing comment 'allow all outgoing traffic'
Deny all incoming traffic:
sudo ufw default deny incoming comment 'deny all incoming traffic'
Obviously we want SSH connections in:
sudo ufw limit in ssh comment 'allow SSH connections in'
Rules updated Rules updated (v6)
Allow additional traffic as per your needs. Some common use-cases:
# allow traffic out to port 53 -- DNS
sudo ufw allow out 53 comment 'allow DNS calls out'
# allow traffic out to port 123 -- NTP
sudo ufw allow out 123 comment 'allow NTP out'
# allow traffic out for HTTP, HTTPS, or FTP
# apt might needs these depending on which sources you're using
sudo ufw allow out http comment 'allow HTTP traffic out'
sudo ufw allow out https comment 'allow HTTPS traffic out'
sudo ufw allow out ftp comment 'allow FTP traffic out'
# allow whois
sudo ufw allow out whois comment 'allow whois'
# allow mails for status notifications -- choose port according to your provider
sudo ufw allow out 25 comment 'allow SMTP out'
sudo ufw allow out 587 comment 'allow SMTP out'
# allow traffic out to port 68 -- the DHCP client
# you only need this if you're using DHCP
sudo ufw allow out 67 comment 'allow the DHCP client to update'
sudo ufw allow out 68 comment 'allow the DHCP client to update'
Note: You'll need to allow HTTP/HTTPS for installing packages and many other things.
Start ufw:
sudo ufw enable
Command may disrupt existing ssh connections. Proceed with operation (y|n)? y Firewall is active and enabled on system startup
If you want to see a status:
sudo ufw status
Status: active To Action From -- ------ ---- 22/tcp LIMIT Anywhere # allow SSH connections in 22/tcp (v6) LIMIT Anywhere (v6) # allow SSH connections in 53 ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow DNS calls out 123 ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow NTP out 80/tcp ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow HTTP traffic out 443/tcp ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow HTTPS traffic out 21/tcp ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow FTP traffic out Mail submission ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow mail out 43/tcp ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow whois 53 (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow DNS calls out 123 (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow NTP out 80/tcp (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow HTTP traffic out 443/tcp (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow HTTPS traffic out 21/tcp (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow FTP traffic out Mail submission (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow mail out 43/tcp (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow whois
or
sudo ufw status verbose
Status: active Logging: on (low) Default: deny (incoming), deny (outgoing), disabled (routed) New profiles: skip To Action From -- ------ ---- 22/tcp LIMIT IN Anywhere # allow SSH connections in 22/tcp (v6) LIMIT IN Anywhere (v6) # allow SSH connections in 53 ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow DNS calls out 123 ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow NTP out 80/tcp ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow HTTP traffic out 443/tcp ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow HTTPS traffic out 21/tcp ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow FTP traffic out 587/tcp (Mail submission) ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow mail out 43/tcp ALLOW OUT Anywhere # allow whois 53 (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow DNS calls out 123 (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow NTP out 80/tcp (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow HTTP traffic out 443/tcp (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow HTTPS traffic out 21/tcp (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow FTP traffic out 587/tcp (Mail submission (v6)) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow mail out 43/tcp (v6) ALLOW OUT Anywhere (v6) # allow whois
If you need to delete a rule
sudo ufw status numbered
[...]
sudo ufw delete 3 #line number of the rule you want to delete
ufw ships with some default applications. You can see them with:
sudo ufw app list
Available applications: AIM Bonjour CIFS DNS Deluge IMAP IMAPS IPP KTorrent Kerberos Admin Kerberos Full Kerberos KDC Kerberos Password LDAP LDAPS LPD MSN MSN SSL Mail submission NFS OpenSSH POP3 POP3S PeopleNearby SMTP SSH Socks Telnet Transmission Transparent Proxy VNC WWW WWW Cache WWW Full WWW Secure XMPP Yahoo qBittorrent svnserve
To get details about the app, like which ports it includes, type:
sudo ufw app info [app name]
sudo ufw app info DNS
Profile: DNS Title: Internet Domain Name Server Description: Internet Domain Name Server Port: 53
If you don't want to create rules by explicitly providing the port number(s), you can create your own application configurations. To do this, create a file in /etc/ufw/applications.d
.
For example, here is what you would use for Plex:
cat /etc/ufw/applications.d/plexmediaserver
[PlexMediaServer] title=Plex Media Server description=This opens up PlexMediaServer for http (32400), upnp, and autodiscovery. ports=32469/tcp|32413/udp|1900/udp|32400/tcp|32412/udp|32410/udp|32414/udp|32400/udp
Then you can enable it like any other app:
sudo ufw allow plexmediaserver
Even if you have a firewall to guard your doors, it is possible to try brute-forcing your way in any of the guarded doors. We want to monitor all network activity to detect potential intrusion attempts, such has repeated attempts to get in, and block them.
I can't explain it any better than user FINESEC from https://serverfault.com/ did at: https://serverfault.com/a/447604/289829.
Fail2BAN scans log files of various applications such as apache, ssh or ftp and automatically bans IPs that show the malicious signs such as automated login attempts. PSAD on the other hand scans iptables and ip6tables log messages (typically /var/log/messages) to detect and optionally block scans and other types of suspect traffic such as DDoS or OS fingerprinting attempts. It's ok to use both programs at the same time because they operate on different level.
And, since we're already using UFW so we'll follow the awesome instructions by netson at https://gist.github.com/netson/c45b2dc4e835761fbccc to make PSAD work with UFW.
psadwatchd
.Install psad.
On Debian based systems:
sudo apt install psad
Make a backup of psad's configuration file /etc/psad/psad.conf
:
sudo cp --archive /etc/psad/psad.conf /etc/psad/psad.conf-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
Review and update configuration options in /etc/psad/psad.conf
. Pay special attention to these:
Setting | Set To |
---|---|
EMAIL_ADDRESSES |
your email address(s) |
HOSTNAME |
your server's hostname |
EXPECT_TCP_OPTIONS |
EXPECT_TCP_OPTIONS Y; |
ENABLE_PSADWATCHD |
ENABLE_PSADWATCHD Y; |
ENABLE_AUTO_IDS |
ENABLE_AUTO_IDS Y; |
ENABLE_AUTO_IDS_EMAILS |
ENABLE_AUTO_IDS_EMAILS Y; |
Check the configuration file psad's documentation at http://www.cipherdyne.org/psad/docs/config.html for more details.
Now we need to make some changes to ufw so it works with psad by telling ufw to log all traffic so psad can analyze it. Do this by editing two files and adding these lines at the end but before the COMMIT line.
Make backups:
sudo cp --archive /etc/ufw/before.rules /etc/ufw/before.rules-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
sudo cp --archive /etc/ufw/before6.rules /etc/ufw/before6.rules-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
Edit the files:
/etc/ufw/before.rules
/etc/ufw/before6.rules
And add add this at the end but before the COMMIT line:
# log all traffic so psad can analyze
-A INPUT -j LOG --log-tcp-options --log-prefix "[IPTABLES] "
-A FORWARD -j LOG --log-tcp-options --log-prefix "[IPTABLES] "
Note: We're adding a log prefix to all the iptables logs. We'll need this for seperating iptables logs to their own file.
For example:
... # log all traffic so psad can analyze -A INPUT -j LOG --log-tcp-options --log-prefix "[IPTABLES] " -A FORWARD -j LOG --log-tcp-options --log-prefix "[IPTABLES] " # don't delete the 'COMMIT' line or these rules won't be processed COMMIT
Now we need to reload/restart ufw and psad for the changes to take effect:
sudo ufw reload
sudo psad -R
sudo psad --sig-update
sudo psad -H
Analyze iptables rules for errors:
sudo psad --fw-analyze
[+] Parsing INPUT chain rules. [+] Parsing INPUT chain rules. [+] Firewall config looks good. [+] Completed check of firewall ruleset. [+] Results in /var/log/psad/fw_check [+] Exiting.
Note: If there were any issues you will get an e-mail with the error.
Check the status of psad:
sudo psad --Status
[-] psad: pid file /var/run/psad/psadwatchd.pid does not exist for psadwatchd on vm [+] psad_fw_read (pid: 3444) %CPU: 0.0 %MEM: 2.2 Running since: Sat Feb 16 01:03:09 2019 [+] psad (pid: 3435) %CPU: 0.2 %MEM: 2.7 Running since: Sat Feb 16 01:03:09 2019 Command line arguments: [none specified] Alert email address(es): root@localhost [+] Version: psad v2.4.3 [+] Top 50 signature matches: [NONE] [+] Top 25 attackers: [NONE] [+] Top 20 scanned ports: [NONE] [+] iptables log prefix counters: [NONE] Total protocol packet counters: [+] IP Status Detail: [NONE] Total scan sources: 0 Total scan destinations: 0 [+] These results are available in: /var/log/psad/status.out
UFW tells your server what doors to board up so nobody can see them, and what doors to allow authorized users through. PSAD monitors network activity to detect and prevent potential intrusions -- repeated attempts to get in.
But what about the applications/services your server is running, like SSH and Apache, where your firewall is configured to allow access in. Even though access may be allowed that doesn't mean all access attempts are valid and harmless. What if someone tries to brute-force their way in to a web-app you're running on your server? This is where Fail2ban comes in.
Fail2ban monitors the logs of your applications (like SSH and Apache) to detect and prevent potential intrusions. It will monitor network traffic/logs and prevent intrusions by blocking suspicious activity (e.g. multiple successive failed connections in a short time-span).
Install fail2ban.
On Debian based systems:
sudo apt install fail2ban
We don't want to edit /etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.conf
or /etc/fail2ban/jail.conf
because a future update may overwrite those so we'll create a local copy instead. Create the file /etc/fail2ban/jail.local
and add this to it after replacing [LAN SEGMENT]
and [your email]
with the appropriate values:
[DEFAULT]
# the IP address range we want to ignore
ignoreip = 127.0.0.1/8 [LAN SEGMENT]
# who to send e-mail to
destemail = [your e-mail]
# who is the email from
sender = [your e-mail]
# since we're using exim4 to send emails
mta = mail
# get email alerts
action = %(action_mwl)s
Note: Your server will need to be able to send e-mails so Fail2ban can let you know of suspicious activity and when it banned an IP.
We need to create a jail for SSH that tells fail2ban to look at SSH logs and use ufw to ban/unban IPs as needed. Create a jail for SSH by creating the file /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ssh.local
and adding this to it:
[sshd]
enabled = true
banaction = ufw
port = ssh
filter = sshd
logpath = %(sshd_log)s
maxretry = 5
cat << EOF | sudo tee /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ssh.local
[sshd]
enabled = true
banaction = ufw
port = ssh
filter = sshd
logpath = %(sshd_log)s
maxretry = 5
EOF
In the above we tell fail2ban to use the ufw as the banaction
. Fail2ban ships with an action configuration file for ufw. You can see it in /etc/fail2ban/action.d/ufw.conf
Enable fail2ban:
sudo fail2ban-client start
sudo fail2ban-client reload
sudo fail2ban-client add sshd # This may fail on some systems if the sshd jail was added by default
To check the status:
sudo fail2ban-client status
Status |- Number of jail: 1 `- Jail list: sshd
sudo fail2ban-client status sshd
Status for the jail: sshd |- Filter | |- Currently failed: 0 | |- Total failed: 0 | `- File list: /var/log/auth.log `- Actions |- Currently banned: 0 |- Total banned: 0 `- Banned IP list:
I have not needed to create a custom jail yet. Once I do, and I figure out how, I will update this guide. Or, if you know how please help contribute.
To unban an IP use this command:
fail2ban-client set [jail] unbanip [IP]
[jail]
is the name of the jail that has the banned IP and [IP]
is the IP address you want to unban. For example, to unaban 192.168.1.100
from SSH you would do:
fail2ban-client set sshd unbanip 192.168.1.100
UFW tells your server what doors to board up so nobody can see them, and what doors to allow authorized users through. PSAD monitors network activity to detect and prevent potential intrusions -- repeated attempts to get in.
CrowdSec is similar to Fail2Ban in that it monitors the logs of your applications (like SSH and Apache) to detect and prevent potential intrusions. However, CrowdSec is coupled with a community that shares threat intelligence back to CrowdSec to then distribute a Community Blocklist to all users.
CrowdSec monitors the logs of your applications (like SSH and Apache) to detect and prevent potential intrusions. It will monitor network traffic/logs and prevent intrusions by blocking suspicious activity (e.g. multiple successive failed connections in a short time-span). Once a malicious IP is detected, it will be added to your local decision list and threat information is shared with CrowdSec to update the Community Blocklist on malicious IP addresses. Once an IP address hits a certain threshold of malicious activity, it will be automatically propogated to all other CrowdSec users to proactively block.
Install CrowdSec Security Engine. (IDS)
On any linux distro (including Debian based systems)
Install the CrowdSec repository:
curl -s https://install.crowdsec.net | sudo sh
Install the CrowdSec Security Engine:
sudo apt install crowdsec
[!TIP] if
curl | sh
is not your thing, you can find additional install methods here.
By default whilst CrowdSec is installing the Security Engine it will auto-discover your installed applications and install the appropriate parsers and scenarios for them. Since we know most Linux servers are running ssh out of the box CrowdSec will automatically configured this for you.
Install a Remediation Component. (IPS)
CrowdSec by itself is a detection engine, since in most modern infrastructures you may have an upstream firewall or WAF, CrowdSec will not block the IP addresses by itself. You can install a Remediation Component to block the IP addresses detected by CrowdSec.
sudo apt install crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-iptables
[!TIP] If your installation of UFW is not using
iptables
as the backend, you can alternatively installcrowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables
. There is no difference in the installed binaries, only the configuration file is different.
By default whilst the Remediation Component is installing it will auto-configure the necessary settings to work with the Security Engine if deployed on the same host (and if the security engine is not within a container environment).
Check detection and remediation is working as intended:
CrowdSec package comes with a CLI tool to check the status of the Security Engine and the Remediation Component.
sudo cscli metrics
Acquisition Metrics:
╭────────────────────────┬────────────┬──────────────┬────────────────┬────────────────────────┬───────────────────╮
│ Source │ Lines read │ Lines parsed │ Lines unparsed │ Lines poured to bucket │ Lines whitelisted │
├────────────────────────┼────────────┼──────────────┼────────────────┼────────────────────────┼───────────────────┤
│ file:/var/log/auth.log │ 5 │ 4 │ 1 │ 10 │ - │
│ file:/var/log/syslog │ 30 │ - │ 30 │ - │ - │
╰────────────────────────┴────────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┴────────────────────────┴───────────────────╯
Local API Decisions:
╭────────────────────────────────────────────┬────────┬────────┬───────╮
│ Reason │ Origin │ Action │ Count │
├────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────┼────────┼───────┤
│ crowdsecurity/http-backdoors-attempts │ CAPI │ ban │ 73 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-bad-user-agent │ CAPI │ ban │ 4836 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-path-traversal-probing │ CAPI │ ban │ 87 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-probing │ CAPI │ ban │ 2010 │
│ crowdsecurity/thinkphp-cve-2018-20062 │ CAPI │ ban │ 88 │
│ crowdsecurity/CVE-2019-18935 │ CAPI │ ban │ 7 │
│ crowdsecurity/CVE-2023-49103 │ CAPI │ ban │ 5 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-admin-interface-probing │ CAPI │ ban │ 91 │
│ ltsich/http-w00tw00t │ CAPI │ ban │ 3 │
│ crowdsecurity/apache_log4j2_cve-2021-44228 │ CAPI │ ban │ 18 │
│ crowdsecurity/nginx-req-limit-exceeded │ CAPI │ ban │ 280 │
│ crowdsecurity/ssh-slow-bf │ CAPI │ ban │ 3412 │
│ crowdsecurity/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965 │ CAPI │ ban │ 1 │
│ crowdsecurity/ssh-cve-2024-6387 │ CAPI │ ban │ 24 │
│ crowdsecurity/CVE-2023-22515 │ CAPI │ ban │ 2 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-cve-2021-41773 │ CAPI │ ban │ 172 │
│ crowdsecurity/netgear_rce │ CAPI │ ban │ 14 │
│ crowdsecurity/ssh-bf │ CAPI │ ban │ 2000 │
│ crowdsecurity/CVE-2022-35914 │ CAPI │ ban │ 1 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-cve-2021-42013 │ CAPI │ ban │ 2 │
│ crowdsecurity/jira_cve-2021-26086 │ CAPI │ ban │ 9 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-sensitive-files │ CAPI │ ban │ 166 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-wordpress-scan │ CAPI │ ban │ 272 │
│ crowdsecurity/CVE-2022-26134 │ CAPI │ ban │ 5 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-generic-bf │ CAPI │ ban │ 7 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-open-proxy │ CAPI │ ban │ 948 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-crawl-non_statics │ CAPI │ ban │ 339 │
│ crowdsecurity/http-cve-probing │ CAPI │ ban │ 5 │
│ crowdsecurity/CVE-2017-9841 │ CAPI │ ban │ 117 │
│ crowdsecurity/CVE-2022-37042 │ CAPI │ ban │ 1 │
│ crowdsecurity/fortinet-cve-2018-13379 │ CAPI │ ban │ 5 │
╰────────────────────────────────────────────┴────────┴────────┴───────╯
Local API Metrics:
╭──────────────────────┬────────┬──────╮
│ Route │ Method │ Hits │
├──────────────────────┼────────┼──────┤
│ /v1/alerts │ GET │ 2 │
│ /v1/decisions/stream │ GET │ 5 │
│ /v1/usage-metrics │ POST │ 2 │
│ /v1/watchers/login │ POST │ 4 │
╰──────────────────────┴────────┴──────╯
Local API Bouncers Metrics:
╭────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────┬────────┬──────╮
│ Bouncer │ Route │ Method │ Hits │
├────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼────────┼──────┤
│ cs-firewall-bouncer-1729025592 │ /v1/decisions/stream │ GET │ 5 │
╰────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────┴────────┴──────╯
Local API Machines Metrics:
╭──────────────────────────────────────────────────┬────────────┬────────┬──────╮
│ Machine │ Route │ Method │ Hits │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────┼────────┼──────┤
│ <your_machine_id_will_be_here> │ /v1/alerts │ GET │ 2 │
╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────┴────────────┴────────┴──────╯
Parser Metrics:
╭─────────────────────────────────┬──────┬────────┬──────────╮
│ Parsers │ Hits │ Parsed │ Unparsed │
├─────────────────────────────────┼──────┼────────┼──────────┤
│ child-crowdsecurity/sshd-logs │ 41 │ 4 │ 37 │
│ child-crowdsecurity/syslog-logs │ 35 │ 35 │ - │
│ crowdsecurity/dateparse-enrich │ 4 │ 4 │ - │
│ crowdsecurity/sshd-logs │ 5 │ 4 │ 1 │
│ crowdsecurity/syslog-logs │ 35 │ 35 │ - │
╰─────────────────────────────────┴──────┴────────┴──────────╯
Scenario Metrics:
╭─────────────────────────────────────┬───────────────┬───────────┬──────────────┬────────┬─────────╮
│ Scenario │ Current Count │ Overflows │ Instantiated │ Poured │ Expired │
├─────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────┼───────────┼──────────────┼────────┼─────────┤
│ crowdsecurity/ssh-bf │ 1 │ - │ 1 │ 4 │ - │
│ crowdsecurity/ssh-bf_user-enum │ 1 │ - │ 1 │ 1 │ - │
│ crowdsecurity/ssh-slow-bf │ 1 │ - │ 1 │ 4 │ - │
│ crowdsecurity/ssh-slow-bf_user-enum │ 1 │ - │ 1 │ 1 │ - │
╰─────────────────────────────────────┴───────────────┴───────────┴──────────────┴────────┴─────────╯
The above output can be daunting, but it's a good way to check that the Security Engine is reading logs and the Remediation Component is blocking IP addresses. So a quick breakdown of each section:
Lines unparsed
column, it means the Security Engine is not able to parse the logs. This could be due to a misconfiguration or the logs are not in the expected format.Count
column, it means the Security Engine has detected malicious activity and has blocked the IP address.
Unparsed
column, it means the Security Engine is not able to parse the logs. This could be due to a misconfiguration or the logs are not in the expected format.Current Count
column, it means the Security Engine has detected malicious activity and is tracking the IP address.To unban an IP use this command:
cscli decisions delete --ip [IP]
[IP]
is the IP address you want to unban. For example, to unban 192.168.1.100
from SSH you would do:
cscli decisions delete --ip 192.168.1.100
WIP
WIP
WIP
Install AIDE.
On Debian based systems:
sudo apt install aide aide-common
Make a backup of AIDE's defaults file:
sudo cp -p /etc/default/aide /etc/default/aide-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
Go through /etc/default/aide
and set AIDE's defaults per your requirements. If you want AIDE to run daily and e-mail you, be sure to set CRON_DAILY_RUN
to yes
.
Make a backup of AIDE's configuration files:
sudo cp -pr /etc/aide /etc/aide-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
On Debian based systems:
/etc/aide/aide.conf.d/
./etc/aide/aide.conf
or /etc/aide/aide.conf.d/
.sudo cp -pr /etc/aide /etc/aide-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
.Create a new database, and install it.
On Debian based systems:
sudo aideinit
Running aide --init... Start timestamp: 2019-04-01 21:23:37 -0400 (AIDE 0.16) AIDE initialized database at /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new Verbose level: 6 Number of entries: 25973 --------------------------------------------------- The attributes of the (uncompressed) database(s): --------------------------------------------------- /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new RMD160 : moyQ1YskQQbidX+Lusv3g2wf1gQ= TIGER : 7WoOgCrXzSpDrlO6I3PyXPj1gRiaMSeo SHA256 : gVx8Fp7r3800WF2aeXl+/KHCzfGsNi7O g16VTPpIfYQ= SHA512 : GYfa0DJwWgMLl4Goo5VFVOhu4BphXCo3 rZnk49PYztwu50XjaAvsVuTjJY5uIYrG tV+jt3ELvwFzGefq4ZBNMg== CRC32 : /cusZw== HAVAL : E/i5ceF3YTjwenBfyxHEsy9Kzu35VTf7 CPGQSW4tl14= GOST : n5Ityzxey9/1jIs7LMc08SULF1sLBFUc aMv7Oby604A= End timestamp: 2019-04-01 21:24:45 -0400 (run time: 1m 8s)
Test everything works with no changes.
On Debian based systems:
sudo aide.wrapper --check
Start timestamp: 2019-04-01 21:24:45 -0400 (AIDE 0.16) AIDE found NO differences between database and filesystem. Looks okay!! Verbose level: 6 Number of entries: 25973 --------------------------------------------------- The attributes of the (uncompressed) database(s): --------------------------------------------------- /var/lib/aide/aide.db RMD160 : moyQ1YskQQbidX+Lusv3g2wf1gQ= TIGER : 7WoOgCrXzSpDrlO6I3PyXPj1gRiaMSeo SHA256 : gVx8Fp7r3800WF2aeXl+/KHCzfGsNi7O g16VTPpIfYQ= SHA512 : GYfa0DJwWgMLl4Goo5VFVOhu4BphXCo3 rZnk49PYztwu50XjaAvsVuTjJY5uIYrG tV+jt3ELvwFzGefq4ZBNMg== CRC32 : /cusZw== HAVAL : E/i5ceF3YTjwenBfyxHEsy9Kzu35VTf7 CPGQSW4tl14= GOST : n5Ityzxey9/1jIs7LMc08SULF1sLBFUc aMv7Oby604A= End timestamp: 2019-04-01 21:26:03 -0400 (run time: 1m 18s)
Test everything works after making some changes.
On Debian based systems:
sudo touch /etc/test.sh
sudo touch /root/test.sh
sudo aide.wrapper --check
sudo rm /etc/test.sh
sudo rm /root/test.sh
sudo aideinit -y -f
Start timestamp: 2019-04-01 21:37:37 -0400 (AIDE 0.16) AIDE found differences between database and filesystem!! Verbose level: 6 Summary: Total number of entries: 25972 Added entries: 2 Removed entries: 0 Changed entries: 1 --------------------------------------------------- Added entries: --------------------------------------------------- f++++++++++++++++: /etc/test.sh f++++++++++++++++: /root/test.sh --------------------------------------------------- Changed entries: --------------------------------------------------- d =.... mc.. .. .: /root --------------------------------------------------- Detailed information about changes: --------------------------------------------------- Directory: /root Mtime : 2019-04-01 21:35:07 -0400 | 2019-04-01 21:37:36 -0400 Ctime : 2019-04-01 21:35:07 -0400 | 2019-04-01 21:37:36 -0400 --------------------------------------------------- The attributes of the (uncompressed) database(s): --------------------------------------------------- /var/lib/aide/aide.db RMD160 : qF9WmKaf2PptjKnhcr9z4ueCPTY= TIGER : zMo7MvvYJcq1hzvTQLPMW7ALeFiyEqv+ SHA256 : LSLLVjjV6r8vlSxlbAbbEsPcQUB48SgP pdVqEn6ZNbQ= SHA512 : Qc4U7+ZAWCcitapGhJ1IrXCLGCf1IKZl 02KYL1gaZ0Fm4dc7xLqjiquWDMSEbwzW oz49NCquqGz5jpMIUy7UxA== CRC32 : z8ChEA== HAVAL : YapzS+/cdDwLj3kHJEq8fufLp3DPKZDg U12KCSkrO7Y= GOST : 74sLV4HkTig+GJhokvxZQm7CJD/NR0mG 6jV7zdt5AXQ= End timestamp: 2019-04-01 21:38:50 -0400 (run time: 1m 13s)
That's it. If you set CRON_DAILY_RUN
to yes
in /etc/default/aide
then cron will execute /etc/cron.daily/aide
every day and e-mail you the output.
Every time you make changes to files/folders that AIDE monitors, you will need to update the database to capture those changes. To do that on Debian based systems:
sudo aideinit -y -f
WIP
clamd
process running to make scanning fasterWIP
clamd
is running all the time. clamd
is only if you're running a mail server and does not provide real-time monitoring of files. Instead, you'd want to scan files manually or on a schedule.Install ClamAV.
On Debian based systems:
sudo apt install clamav clamav-freshclam clamav-daemon
Make a backup of clamav-freshclam
's configuration file /etc/clamav/freshclam.conf
:
sudo cp --archive /etc/clamav/freshclam.conf /etc/clamav/freshclam.conf-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
clamav-freshclam
's default settings are probably good enough but if you want to change them, you can either edit the file /etc/clamav/freshclam.conf
or use dpkg-reconfigure
:
sudo dpkg-reconfigure clamav-freshclam
Note: The default settings will update the definitions 24 times in a day. To change the interval, check the Checks
setting in /etc/clamav/freshclam.conf
or use dpkg-reconfigure
.
Start the clamav-freshclam
service:
sudo service clamav-freshclam start
You can make sure clamav-freshclam
running:
sudo service clamav-freshclam status
● clamav-freshclam.service - ClamAV virus database updater Loaded: loaded (/lib/systemd/system/clamav-freshclam.service; enabled; vendor preset: enabled) Active: active (running) since Sat 2019-03-16 22:57:07 EDT; 2min 13s ago Docs: man:freshclam(1) man:freshclam.conf(5) https://www.clamav.net/documents Main PID: 1288 (freshclam) CGroup: /system.slice/clamav-freshclam.service └─1288 /usr/bin/freshclam -d --foreground=true Mar 16 22:57:08 host freshclam[1288]: Sat Mar 16 22:57:08 2019 -> ^Local version: 0.100.2 Recommended version: 0.101.1 Mar 16 22:57:08 host freshclam[1288]: Sat Mar 16 22:57:08 2019 -> DON'T PANIC! Read https://www.clamav.net/documents/upgrading-clamav Mar 16 22:57:15 host freshclam[1288]: Sat Mar 16 22:57:15 2019 -> Downloading main.cvd [100%] Mar 16 22:57:38 host freshclam[1288]: Sat Mar 16 22:57:38 2019 -> main.cvd updated (version: 58, sigs: 4566249, f-level: 60, builder: sigmgr) Mar 16 22:57:40 host freshclam[1288]: Sat Mar 16 22:57:40 2019 -> Downloading daily.cvd [100%] Mar 16 22:58:13 host freshclam[1288]: Sat Mar 16 22:58:13 2019 -> daily.cvd updated (version: 25390, sigs: 1520006, f-level: 63, builder: raynman) Mar 16 22:58:14 host freshclam[1288]: Sat Mar 16 22:58:14 2019 -> Downloading bytecode.cvd [100%] Mar 16 22:58:16 host freshclam[1288]: Sat Mar 16 22:58:16 2019 -> bytecode.cvd updated (version: 328, sigs: 94, f-level: 63, builder: neo) Mar 16 22:58:24 host freshclam[1288]: Sat Mar 16 22:58:24 2019 -> Database updated (6086349 signatures) from db.local.clamav.net (IP: 104.16.219.84) Mar 16 22:58:24 host freshclam[1288]: Sat Mar 16 22:58:24 2019 -> ^Clamd was NOT notified: Can't connect to clamd through /var/run/clamav/clamd.ctl: No such file or directory
Note: Don't worry about that Local version
line. Check https://serverfault.com/questions/741299/is-there-a-way-to-keep-clamav-updated-on-debian-8 for more details.
Make a backup of clamav-daemon
's configuration file /etc/clamav/clamd.conf
:
sudo cp --archive /etc/clamav/clamd.conf /etc/clamav/clamd.conf-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
You can change clamav-daemon
's settings by editing the file /etc/clamav/clamd.conf
or useing dpkg-reconfigure
:
sudo dpkg-reconfigure clamav-daemon
clamscan
program.clamscan
runs as the user it is executed as so it needs read permissions to the files/folders it is scanning. clamscan
as root
is dangerous because if a file is in fact a virus there is risk that it could use the root privileges.clamscan /path/to/file
.clamscan -r /path/to/folder
.-i
switch to only print infected files.clamscan
's man
pages for other switches/options.WIP
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WIP
Install Rkhunter.
On Debian based systems:
sudo apt install rkhunter
Make a backup of rkhunter' defaults file:
sudo cp -p /etc/default/rkhunter /etc/default/rkhunter-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
rkhunter's configuration file is /etc/rkhunter.conf
. Instead of making changes to it, create and use the file /etc/rkhunter.conf.local
instead:
sudo cp -p /etc/rkhunter.conf /etc/rkhunter.conf.local
Go through the configuration file /etc/rkhunter.conf.local
and set to your requirements. My recommendations:
Setting | Note |
---|---|
UPDATE_MIRRORS=1 |
|
MIRRORS_MODE=0 |
|
MAIL-ON-WARNING=root |
|
COPY_LOG_ON_ERROR=1 |
to save a copy of the log if there is an error |
PKGMGR=... |
set to the appropriate value per the documentation |
PHALANX2_DIRTEST=1 |
read the documentation for why |
WEB_CMD="" |
this is to address an issue with the Debian package that disables the ability for rkhunter to self-update. |
USE_LOCKING=1 |
to prevent issues with rkhunter running multiple times |
SHOW_SUMMARY_WARNINGS_NUMBER=1 |
to see the actual number of warnings found |
You want rkhunter to run every day and e-mail you the result. You can write your own script or check https://www.tecmint.com/install-rootkit-hunter-scan-for-rootkits-backdoors-in-linux/ for a sample cron script you can use.
On Debian based system, rkhunter comes with cron scripts. To enable them check /etc/default/rkhunter
or use dpkg-reconfigure
and say Yes
to all of the questions:
sudo dpkg-reconfigure rkhunter
After you've finished with all of the changes, make sure all the settings are valid:
sudo rkhunter -C
Update rkhunter and its database:
sudo rkhunter --versioncheck
sudo rkhunter --update
sudo rkhunter --propupd
If you want to do a manual scan and see the output:
sudo rkhunter --check
WIP
WIP
WIP
Install chkrootkit.
On Debian based systems:
sudo apt install chkrootkit
Do a manual scan:
sudo chkrootkit
ROOTDIR is `/' Checking `amd'... not found Checking `basename'... not infected Checking `biff'... not found Checking `chfn'... not infected Checking `chsh'... not infected ... Checking `scalper'... not infected Checking `slapper'... not infected Checking `z2'... chklastlog: nothing deleted Checking `chkutmp'... chkutmp: nothing deleted Checking `OSX_RSPLUG'... not infected
Make a backup of chkrootkit's configuration file /etc/chkrootkit.conf
:
sudo cp --archive /etc/chkrootkit.conf /etc/chkrootkit.conf-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
You want chkrootkit to run every day and e-mail you the result.
On Debian based system, chkrootkit comes with cron scripts. To enable them check /etc/chkrootkit.conf
or use dpkg-reconfigure
and say Yes
to the first question:
sudo dpkg-reconfigure chkrootkit
Your server will be generating a lot of logs that may contain important information. Unless you plan on checking your server everyday, you'll want a way to get e-mail summary of your server's logs. To accomplish this we'll use logwatch.
logwatch scans system log files and summarizes them. You can run it directly from the command line or schedule it to run on a recurring schedule. logwatch uses service files to know how to read/summarize a log file. You can see all of the stock service files in /usr/share/logwatch/scripts/services
.
logwatch's configuration file /usr/share/logwatch/default.conf/logwatch.conf
specifies default options. You can override them via command line arguments.
range
option to cover your recurrence window. See https://www.badpenguin.org/configure-logwatch-for-weekly-email-and-html-output-format for an example.Install logwatch.
On Debian based systems:
sudo apt install logwatch
To see a sample of what logwatch collects you can run it directly:
sudo /usr/sbin/logwatch --output stdout --format text --range yesterday --service all
################### Logwatch 7.4.3 (12/07/16) #################### Processing Initiated: Mon Mar 4 00:05:50 2019 Date Range Processed: yesterday ( 2019-Mar-03 ) Period is day. Detail Level of Output: 5 Type of Output/Format: stdout / text Logfiles for Host: host ################################################################## --------------------- Cron Begin ------------------------ ... ... ---------------------- Disk Space End ------------------------- ###################### Logwatch End #########################
Go through logwatch's self-documented configuration file /usr/share/logwatch/default.conf/logwatch.conf
before continuing. There is no need to change anything here but pay special attention to the Output
, Format
, MailTo
, Range
, and Service
as those are the ones we'll be using. For our purposes, instead of specifying our options in the configuration file, we will pass them as command line arguments in the daily cron job that executes logwatch. That way, if the configuration file is ever modified (e.g. during an update), our options will still be there.
Make a backup of logwatch's daily cron file /etc/cron.daily/00logwatch
and unset the execute bit:
sudo cp --archive /etc/cron.daily/00logwatch /etc/cron.daily/00logwatch-COPY-$(date +"%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
sudo chmod -x /etc/cron.daily/00logwatch-COPY*
By default, logwatch outputs to stdout
. Since the goal is to get a daily e-mail, we need to change the output type that logwatch uses to send e-mail instead. We could do this through the configuration file above, but that would apply to every time it is run -- even when we run it manually and want to see the output to the screen. Instead, we'll change the cron job that executes logwatch to send e-mail. This way, when run manually, we'll still get output to stdout
and when run by cron, it'll send an e-mail. We'll also make sure it checks for all services, and change the output format to html so it's easier to read regardless of what the configuration file says. In the file /etc/cron.daily/00logwatch
find the execute line and change it to:
/usr/sbin/logwatch --output mail --format html --mailto root --range yesterday --service all
#!/bin/bash #Check if removed-but-not-purged test -x /usr/share/logwatch/scripts/logwatch.pl || exit 0 #execute /usr/sbin/logwatch --output mail --format html --mailto root --range yesterday --service all #Note: It's possible to force the recipient in above command #Just pass --mailto address@a.com instead of --output mail
sudo sed -i -r -e "s,^($(sudo which logwatch).*?),# \1 # commented by $(whoami) on $(date +"%Y-%m-%d @ %H:%M:%S")\n$(sudo which logwatch) --output mail --format html --mailto root --range yesterday --service all # added by $(whoami) on $(date +"%Y-%m-%d @ %H:%M:%S")," /etc/cron.daily/00logwatch
You can test the cron job by executing it:
sudo /etc/cron.daily/00logwatch
Note: If logwatch fails to deliver mail due to the e-mail having long lines please check https://blog.dhampir.no/content/exim4-line-length-in-debian-stretch-mail-delivery-failed-returning-message-to-sender as documented in issue #29. If you followed Gmail and Exim4 As MTA With Implicit TLS then we already took care of this in step #7.
Ports are how applications, services, and processes communicate with each other -- either locally within your server or with other devices on the network. When you have an application or service (like SSH or Apache) running on your server, they listen for requests on specific ports.
Obviously we don't want your server listening on ports we don't know about. We'll use ss
to see all the ports that services are listening on. This will help us track down and stop rogue, potentially dangerous, services.
man ss
To see the all the ports listening for traffic:
sudo ss -lntup
Netid State Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port udp UNCONN 0 0 *:68 *:* users:(("dhclient",pid=389,fd=6)) tcp LISTEN 0 128 *:22 *:* users:(("sshd",pid=4390,fd=3)) tcp LISTEN 0 128 :::22 :::* users:(("sshd",pid=4390,fd=4))
Switch Explanations:
l
= display listening socketsn
= do not try to resolve service namest
= display TCP socketsu
= display UDP socketsp
= show process informationIf you see anything suspicious, like a port you're not aware of or a process you don't know, investigate and remediate as necessary.
From https://cisofy.com/lynis/:
Lynis is a battle-tested security tool for systems running Linux, macOS, or Unix-based operating system. It performs an extensive health scan of your systems to support system hardening and compliance testing.
Install lynis. https://cisofy.com/lynis/#installation has detailed instructions on how to install it for your distribution.
On Debian based systems, using CISOFY's community software repository:
sudo apt install apt-transport-https ca-certificates host
sudo wget -O - https://packages.cisofy.com/keys/cisofy-software-public.key | sudo apt-key add -
sudo echo "deb https://packages.cisofy.com/community/lynis/deb/ stable main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/cisofy-lynis.list
sudo apt update
sudo apt install lynis host
Update it:
sudo lynis update info
Run a security audit:
sudo lynis audit system
This will scan your server, report its audit findings, and at the end it will give you suggestions. Spend some time going through the output and address gaps as necessary.
From https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids
OSSEC is a full platform to monitor and control your systems. It mixes together all the aspects of HIDS (host-based intrusion detection), log monitoring and SIM/SIEM together in a simple, powerful and open source solution.
Install OSSEC-HIDS from sources
sudo apt install -y libz-dev libssl-dev libpcre2-dev build-essential libsystemd-dev
wget https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/archive/3.7.0.tar.gz
tar xzf 3.7.0.tar.gz
cd ossec-hids-3.7.0/
sudo ./install.sh
Useful commands:
Agent information
sudo /var/ossec/bin/agent_control -i <AGENT_ID>
AGENT_ID
by default is 000
, to be sure the command sudo /var/ossec/bin/agent_control -l
can be used.
Run integrity/rootkit checking
OSSEC by default run rootkit check each 2 hours.
sudo /var/ossec/bin/agent_control -u <AGENT_ID> -r
Alerts
tail -f /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.log
sudo cat /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.log | grep -A4 -i integrity
sudo cat /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.log | grep -A4 "rootcheck,"
This sections cover things that are high risk because there is a possibility they can make your system unusable, or are considered unnecessary by many because the risks outweigh any rewards.
!! PROCEED AT YOUR OWN RISK !!