The text of the current e-mail to confirm the change in e-mail address (contained in the check_new_email.pt message), does not present to the legitimate user the new e-mail address that the IT infrastructure has been requested to use in the future.
This is a security gap, because the legitimate user can click on the confirmation link without paying much attention to it, and the usurpator of his/her identity on the platform (which has stolen the legitimate user's pseudonym and password) has breached the last link between the legitimate user and his/her account, as described in Issue #124.
Desired situation
The text of the e-mail should clearly display the new e-mail address, i.e. the one to be used in the future, so that the legitimate user has a clear view on the decision that s/he takes by clicking (or not) on the proposed link.
Current situation
The text of the current e-mail to confirm the change in e-mail address (contained in the check_new_email.pt message), does not present to the legitimate user the new e-mail address that the IT infrastructure has been requested to use in the future.
This is a security gap, because the legitimate user can click on the confirmation link without paying much attention to it, and the usurpator of his/her identity on the platform (which has stolen the legitimate user's pseudonym and password) has breached the last link between the legitimate user and his/her account, as described in Issue #124.
Desired situation
The text of the e-mail should clearly display the new e-mail address, i.e. the one to be used in the future, so that the legitimate user has a clear view on the decision that s/he takes by clicking (or not) on the proposed link.