2024-08-cork-protocol-0xjoichiro/Depeg-swap/contracts/core/flash-swaps/FlashSwapRouter.sol
By demanding that the receiver of the owner permissions actively accept via a contract call of its
own, `Ownable2Step` and `Ownable2StepUpgradeable` prevent the contract ownership from accidentally
being transferred to an address that cannot handle it.
Details: https://sg.run/yBAA
25┆ contract RouterState is IDsFlashSwapUtility, IDsFlashSwapCore, OwnableUpgradeable,
UUPSUpgradeable, IUniswapV2Callee {
2024-08-cork-protocol-0xjoichiro/Depeg-swap/contracts/core/assets/AssetFactory.sol
By demanding that the receiver of the owner permissions actively accept via a contract call of its
own, `Ownable2Step` and `Ownable2StepUpgradeable` prevent the contract ownership from accidentally
being transferred to an address that cannot handle it.
Details: https://sg.run/yBAA
14┆ contract AssetFactory is IAssetFactory, OwnableUpgradeable, UUPSUpgradeable {
2024-08-cork-protocol-0xjoichiro/Depeg-swap/contracts/core/assets/Asset.sol
By demanding that the receiver of the owner permissions actively accept via a contract call of its
own, `Ownable2Step` and `Ownable2StepUpgradeable` prevent the contract ownership from accidentally
being transferred to an address that cannot handle it.
Details: https://sg.run/yBAA
72┆ contract Asset is ERC20Burnable, ERC20Permit, Ownable, Expiry, ExchangeRate {
Owner of Assets and AssetsFactory contracts will be our own contracts like moduleCore/Config contracts only,
so majorly it will not transfer owenrship mistakenly.
so will not fix this
Mammoth Laurel Nightingale
Low/Info
use-ownable2step
Summary
Vulnerability Detail
Impact
Code Snippet
Tool used
Manual Review
Recommendation